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NOTES
DRUG LEGALIZATION: COST EFFECTIVE
AND MORALLY PERMISSIBLE
The United States is more concerned with illicit drug use than
any other national problem.' The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("1988
Act" or "Act") describes the United States government's attempt to
control this problem. 2 The 1988 Act provides for treatment and
prevention programs, drug education programs, and a plan for
international narcotics control. 3
 The 1988 Act also places a priority
REPORT ON LEGALIZATION OF [Liam DRUGS: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, SELECT COMM.
ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 101ST GONG., 1ST SESS. 3 (Comm. Print 1989) [herein-
after LEGALIZATION: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY]. The annual number of infants born addicted
to crack is between 30,000-50,000. Brill, Should We Give up?, AM. LAW., Mar., 1990, at 47.
Crack is a smokeable form of cocaine that produces both shorter and more intense highs
than powder cocaine. E. GOODE, DRUGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 202 (3d ed. 1989).
With the emergence of new powerful drugs such as ice, public concern continues to
escalate. Ice is a smokeable crystalline form of methamphetamine (speed). Metlumphetamine
Trafficking and Abuse: Hearings Before the Select Comm. On Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of
Rep., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989) (statement of David Westrate, Ass't. Adm'r., DEA)
[hereinafter Hearings: Methamphetamine]. Ice wilt not receive much attention in this note
because, despite widespread concern, there has not yet been an ice epidemic in the United
States. See Meddis, U.S, Drug Users Steer Clear of Ice, USA Today, Apr. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
Thus far, ice has been a problem only in Hawaii and parts of California. Id,
2 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4181 [hereinafter 1988 Act].
Nonetheless, ten states have de-criminalized possession of marijuana to various degrees.
See National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, State-By-State Comparison of
the Marijuana Laws. (Available from NORML, Suite 640, 2001 'S' Street NW, Washington,
D.C. 20009). For example, in Colorado, possession of up to one ounce of marijuana in private
is punishable by a fine ranging from $0-100. Id. Conviction for the cultivation and sale of
marijuana brings much higher penalties than possession and personal use in most states. See
id.
See 1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4191; id. at 4244; id. at 4261. In addition, the Act
authorizes the death penalty for drug traffickers whose trafficking results in murder, id. at
4587, holds users accountable by denying them public housing grants, ed. at 4300, appoints
a director of national drug control policy, id. at 4181, and allows the Secretary of State to
make international agreements to prevent money laundering. Id. at 4291,
The 1988 Act increased funding authorization for 1989 by 2.7 billion dollars but Con-
gress allocated only about $500 million in additional funds. CRS Report for Congress, Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988: Highlights of Enacted Bill, at CRS 1 (1988). The Graham-Rudman-
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on drug education.' The Act funds research, education, and coun-
seling programs for high-risk groups, including youth gang mem-
bers, runaways, and the homeless. 5
Legislators of the 1988 Act stated that efforts to reduce user
demand for drugs are necessary to win the war on drugs. 6 The
1988 Act revises previous strategies to reduce the demand for drugs
in two basic ways.' First, the Act begins to implement a nation-wide
program of treatment on request for both addicts and drug abu-
sers.8 Second, the 1988 Act provides civil penalties for users.°
Unfortunately, statistics indicate that, although there has been
a decline in the use of most drugs, including alcohol and tobacco,
the number of heavy cocaine users has increased.") Although the
number of people who used cocaine once a month or more dropped
from 5.8 million in 1985 to 1.6 million in 1990" and the estimated
number of weekly cocaine users in 1990 was 662,000, down from
882,000 in 1988,' 2 the number of daily, or almost daily, cocaine
users increased from 292,000 in 1988 to 336,000 in 1990.' 3
Hollings Act, the balanced budget bill, has limited Congress's ability to earmark money for
fighting the war on drugs. Cloud, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 807 (1989).
1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4254. Congress allocated $15 million in the 1989 budget for
drug education and prevention. Id. at 4254-55.
5 id. at 4255-58.
6 1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4310.
7 Cloud, supra note 3, at 803.
1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4191.
9 Cloud, supra note 3, at 803.
'° See generally U.S. Dept of Health and Human Servs., HHS News press release (Dec.
19, 1990) [hereinafter HHS News] (reviewing major findings of 1990 National Institute on
Drug Abuse ("NIDA") Household Survey on Drug Abuse); Green, Federal Survey Reports
Sharp Drop in Drug Use, Miami Herald, Dec. 20, 1990, at A1, col. 5. Statistics cited by both
proponents and opponents of legalization, however, are necessarily imprecise because of the
illegal nature of the activity they purport to describe. See Mandel, Problems With the Official
Drug Statistics, 21 STAN. L. REV. 991, 991 (1969). In addition, the NIDA survey does not
sample prisons, dormitories or the homeless. I-IHS News, supra, at 4.
" See HHS News, supra note 10, at 1.
12 Id. at 2.
Id. The democratic staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee has criticized NIDA's
figures, and estimates that drug use may be three times as prevalent as NIDA's survey
suggests. Isikoff, Senate Study Triples Cocaine-User Estimate, Wash. Post, May 11, 1990, at A4,
cal. 1. The judiciary committee surveys drug treatment centers, the homeless and prisoners
but does not survey the general population. Green, supra note 10, at A26, col. 1. With respect
to crack cocaine, the number of past-year (one million) and past-month (one-half million)
crack users did not change appreciably from 1988 to 1990. See NHS News, supra note 10, at
2. Crack use among high school seniors reportedly leveled off in 1987. U.S. DEP'T of HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., DRUG USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING-NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS FROM
HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE, AND YOUNG ADULT POPULATIONS 1975-1988, 5-6 (1989) [herein-
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Marijuana, however, continues to be the most commonly used
illicit substance even though the number of past-month users has
been decreasing since 1979." In 1990, approximately 5.5 million
people in the United States used marijuana once a week or more,
and 3.3 million were daily or almost daily users. 15 Meanwhile, heroin
use is reportedly similar to crack use, with about 500,000 regular
users.'"
Advocates of continued criminalization of drugs point to this
downward trend in drug use, especially evident with cocaine and
marijuana over the past two to five years, to suggest that the gov-
ernment is winning the "all fronts" war on drugs.' 7 Meanwhile, a
government study from 1975 to 1988 closely links the percentage
of casual cocaine (which includes crack) and marijuana use to the
potential users' perception of the harm that would result from using
these drugs.' 8
 During this thirteen year span, high school and col-
lege students, and other young adults reported a consistently high
degree of availability of marijuana and cocaine.'" Nevertheless, use
of these two drugs fluctuated greatly in accordance with users'
perceptions of the likelihood that great harm would result from
regular use of marijuana or use of cocaine one or two times.'" The
researchers who conducted the study attribute the increased per-
ception of harm related to crack, cocaine, and marijuana to exten-
sive media coverage. 21 Another researcher, explaining that alcohol
and cigarette use have also decreased, suggests that increased health
after DRUG USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING]. About 3.1% of high schohl seniors and young
adults had used crack in 1988. Id. In all, an estimated 2.75 million people in the United
States have tried crack. U.S. Dept of Health and Human Servs., Population Estimates of Lifetime
and Current Drug Use, N1DA CAPSULES, at C-83-1(a) (rev. Dec. 1990) [hereinafter Population
Estimates].
" HHS News, supra note 10, at 3.
15 Id.
16 Ostrowski, Thinking About Drug Legalization, 12 POLY ANALYSIS, 24 (Cato Inst. May
25, 1989); Zinberg, Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs: A Search For New Directions, 11
NOVA L. REV. 901, 903 (1987). According to NIDA, 1.66 million have tried heroin and 50,000
used heroin in the month preceding their survey. Population Estimates, supra note 13, at 1.
One author estimates that 1.2% of high school students use heroin and .2% of college students
are users. Covington, Addict Attitudes Towards Legalization of Heroin, CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS,
315, 344 (1987). A government study indicates that the rate of heroin use is .5% for high
school students and .2% for college students. DRUG USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING, supra note
13, at 8.
17
 See L. Sullivan, Report for Secretary of Health and Human Services ( July 31, 1989).
11
 See DRUG USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING (figures 23, 24), supra note 13, at 132-33.
15 Id.
25 See id.
21 Id.
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consciousness explains the downward trend. 22 Researchers have at-
tributed the decline in the use of illicit drugs to several factors,
including effective enforcement, an increased awareness of the
health risk of drug use, and a general emphasis on health conscious-
ness.
Although there appears to have been a decline in drug use, the
government's drug policy cannot eradicate drug use for several
reasons. First, crack, cocaine, and heroin are potentially addictive
drugs. One writer states that cocaine addicts constitute only ten
percent of the total population of cocaine users but account for
about seventy-five percent of the cocaine used in the United States."
Because these addicted users are willing to take large risks to main-
tain their habits, legal deterrents may be ineffective. 24
Next, the economic theory of inelasticity further explains why
the criminal law has been only somewhat effective in reducing
addicts' demand for certain drugs. 25 Normally, as the price of an
item rises, the item attracts fewer buyers. 26 This phenomenon is
called the elasticity of demand. 27 Where demand is inelastic, how-
ever, buyers are willing to absorb an increase in price because they
are eager to consume the same quantity of the product. 28 The price
of black market drugs rises in response to the increased risk that
sellers and dealers experience while conducting business during
heightened enforcement. 29 These higher prices, however, will deter
non-addict drug users from continued drug purchases more than
addicts because addicts' demand for drugs is inelastic. 30 Thus, an
increase in price through greater enforcement reduces the number
of non-addict users significantly but has a slight effect on the addict
users. 3 '
Third, drug enforcement efforts have been less than successful
because there are insufficient resources with which to battle the
22 Green, supra note 10, at 26A, col. 1.
23 Cloud, supra note 3, at 734.
21 Id. at 735.
28 See id. at 758-67 (addicts' demand for cocaine relatively inelastic). But see Grinspoon,
A Proposal For Regulation and Taxation of Drugs, 11 Nov?, L. Ray. 927, 928 (1987) (citing some
evidence of elasticity of demand for heroin).
26 Cloud, supra note 3, at 758.
22 Id. at 761.
28 Id. at 762.
29 Id. at 759.
" Cf id. at 763 (cocaine use and crack use is inelastic).
81 Id. It is true that heroin demand is not perfectly inelastic because users can and do
reduce consumption voluntarily in response to price increases without experiencing with-
drawal. See M. MoottE, BUY AND BUST 8-9 (1977).
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dealers and traffickers.32
 About ten billion dollars is spent annually
to combat drug use, 33
 yet there are only about 2800 drug enforce-
ment agents." As recently as 1987, the likelihood that any particular
drug user would be arrested in a given year was slight. 35
At the same time, drug enforcement has had a profound impact
on the criminal justice system. As of 1987, more than one-third of
all federal prison inmates and one-tenth of state prisoners were
incarcerated for drug law violations." One state court judge esti-
mates that eighty to ninety percent of the cases he handles are drug-
related." In 1988, federal prisons worked at 130% of capacity and
many state prisons were also overburdened." To cope with over-
crowding, courts have begun releasing prisoners before they com-
plete their sentences. 39
 Because many drugs are addictive and gov-
ernment resources are limited, the government will continue to fight
an uphill battle against illicit drug use.
Some people who believe that drug criminalization is ineffective
advocate legalizing some or all illicit drugs:m Advocates of legali-
zation believe that criminalization causes more harm than good.'"
Proponents of legalization believe that crime will decrease if drugs
are legalized. 42
 They also believe that funds spent on drug enforce-
ment can be earmarked for more beneficial purposes, such as drug
32
 Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility, Part I: Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. On Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1988) (statement of Sen.
Rangel, Chairman) [hereinafter Hearings: Legalization]. But see, Ostrowski, supra note 16, at
29 (failure of drug enforcement not due to lack of effort). Cf. Interview with Arnold Trebach,
President of Drug Policy Foundation, printed in LAW ENFORCEMENT NEws, Apr. 30, 1988, at
9 [hereinafter Trebach Interview] (no amount of funds can stop use of illicit drugs).
Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 2.
34
 Hearings: Legalization, supra note 32, at 2.
35
 Cloud, supra note 3, at 771. The actual figure is 2.5%. The author notes that most of
those arrested are actually caught for trafficking drugs rather than for possession. Id. Former
National Drug Policy Director William J. Bennett admits that the drug program has expe-
rienced setbacks, referring in particular to the inability to get new prisons built. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1989, at A 1, cot 3.
" Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States, SCIENCE, Sept. 1, 1989, at 940.
" See l29 F.R.D. 217, 251 (1990) (proceedings of the Fiftieth Judicial Conference of
the D.C. Circuit).
38
 THE WHITE HOUSE., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 27 (Sept. 1989)(Presidential
report to Congress outlining drug control strategy).
33
 See id.
'0
 See, e.g., Hearings: Legalization, supra note 32, at 180 (testimony of Kurt Schmoke,
mayor of Baltimore); Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at
All, col, 4 (editorial by Milton Friedman),
See, e.g., Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 9.
42 Church, Thinking The Unthinkable, Trist, May 30, 1988, at 14.
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education. 43 Further, they argue that legalizing drugs and taxing
them will provide additional funds for treatment and education."
This note examines several aspects of the drug legalization
debate. Section I addresses some of the practical consequences of
legalizing drug use:15 In particular, this section discusses the con-
nection between drug use, crime and violence, death, and addic-
tion. 46 In addition to practical concerns about legalization, many
opponents of legalization believe that drug use is immoral:" Section
Il discusses three prominent ethical theories bearing on whether
drug legalization is moral, immoral, or amoral:" Section III con-
cludes that drug legalization is a pragmatic and morally defensible
solution to the drug problem. 49
I. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG LEGALIZATION
Drug use has a variety of deleterious effects on society. Drug
use costs the United States as much as sixty billion dollars a year in
lost productivity. 50 Drug use may lead to crime and/or violence, and
users may steal to be able to afford illegal drugs. 51 It may cause
users to become irrational and hurt or kill themselves. 52 Moreover,
use of cocaine, crack, and heroin may lead to physical addiction.
Many critics of drug legalization offer these aspects of drug use as
justification for the drug laws."
45 Id.
" Brill, supra note 1, at 48; Natick-mum, supra note 36, at 941.
4' See infra notes 50-125 and accompanying text.
4' There are practical issues concerning legalization in addition to those mentioned here.
This note focuses on crime, death, and addiction because they have a direct bearing on the
moral issues involved in legalization. One argument not discussed in detail here is the
likelihood that marijuana use acts as a "stepping stone" to the use of "harder drugs." See E.
Goone, supra note 1, at 155-59 (reviewing relationship between marijuana use and use of
other drugs); Trebach Interview, supra note 32, at 12 (rejecting theory that marijuana use
leads to use of other drugs); Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and
Analysis of a Failed Policy, 21 COLUM. J.L. Sc Soc. PROBS., 417, 429 (1988) (association between
use of marijuana and other drugs not proof of stepping stone because the type of person
who wishes to experiment with marijuana may wish independently to try other drugs)
(quoting Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Health, 36-38 (1982)).
47 See, e.g., 1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4296 (Congress finds legalization unconscionable).
4" See infra notes 126-329 and accompanying text. This note does not attempt to
persuade anyone that any particular moral theory discussed here is correct. Rather, this note
attempts to show that the supposed immorality of drug use is problematic.
49 See infra notes 356-85 and accompanying text.
" Husak, Recreational Drugs and Paternalism, 8 LAW & Plitt.., 353, 358 n.15 (1989).
5' Jarvik, The Drug Dilemma, SCIENCE, Oct. 19, 1990, at 387, 389.
51 Id .
" See, e.g., Husak, supra note 50, at 374, 378.
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In contrast, drug legalization proponents argue that the drug
laws contribute significantly to these problems, 54 and claim that
legalization will ameliorate the harmful consequences of drug use. 55
This section of the note examines the connection between drug use
and the drug laws, crime, death, and addiction, and concludes with
an examination of the licit drugs alcohol and tobacco. This exami-
nation provides a basis for evaluating whether the practical justifi-
cations for criminalization are persuasive.
A. Illicit Drug Use and Its Effects on Society
Many people oppose drug legalization because they fear that
crime will increase. 58
 There are at least three distinct types of drug-
related crime: crimes committed by drug users because of the influ-
ence of the drug (psychopharmacological),57 crimes committed by
traffickers and dealers on the black market to secure loyalties and
resolve disputes (systemic), 58 and crimes committed by users to sup-
port their drug use (economic compulsive). 59
Psychopharmacological crime arises from the chemical effects
of the drug itself. A common perception exists that use of illicit
drugs causes users to become violent and criminal."° Marijuana laws,
in fact, were originally enacted in response to this perception that
its use led to violence and crime. 9 '
54 See Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 939.
• Husak, supra note 50, at 363.
• Ostrowski, supra note 16, at I I. Sources estimate that at least 40 to 50% of all property
crime is drug-related. Id. In 1980, one estimate is that over 2000 \homicides were drug-
related as were 460,000 assaults. NARCOTIC AND DRUG RESEARCII INC., DRUG RELATED IN-
VOLVEMENT IN VIOLENT EPISODES (DRIVE), INTERIM FINAL REPORT 10-11 ( July, 1987) [here-
inafter DRI V El.
57 See Goldstein, The DrugslViolence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 1985 J. DRUG
ISSUES, 493, 494; Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941. Goldstein developed the names for these
categories. Goldstein focuses on drugs and violence; Nadelmann refers to drugs and crime.
58 Goldstein, supra note 57, at 497; Nwlelmann, supra note 36, at 941-42.
59 Goldstein, supra note 57, at 496; Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941.
6° Goldstein, supra note 57, at 496; Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941.
61
 Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 13. Although marijuana use was linked initially to psy-
chopharmacological crime and violence, researchers no longer make this association. E.
GooDE, supra note 1, at 145; Slaughter,•supra note 46, at 423. In the Netherlands, where
marijuana laws are not enforced, no increase in crime due to marijuana use has been
reported. E. Engelsman, Responding to Drug Problems: Dutch Policy and Practice 11 (Oct.
20-23, 1988) (unpublished paper presented at Drug Policy Foundation International Con-
ference on Drug Policy Reform). Marijuana use may occasionally lead to feelings of paranoia
in the user. In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, DEA, No. 86-22 at 60 (Sept. 6, 1988).
These feelings are usually due to fears of using an illegal substance and do not have any
long-term effects. Id.
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It is well documented that cocaine can induce aggressive be-
havior. 62
 Researchers believe that crack use is more likely to induce
violent behavior than other cocaine use. 63 One researcher, however,
points out that scientific research does not yet justify media claims
about crack's tendency to cause violence, and reminds us that mar-
ijuana was once mistakenly attacked for leading to psychopharma-
cological violence"'
Researchers have not found that use of heroin induces psycho-
pharmacological violence° More generally, heroin use does not
cause crime° According to studies, heroin users usually interact in
6
62 See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 13. In the mid 1980s, Narcotic and Drug Research,
Inc. conducted a study ("DRIVE") of known male drug users and dealers, which charted the
number and type of violent episodes reported by users, and noted which drugs were involved
in the violence. See DRIVE, supra note 56, at 114. In DRIVE, approximately 50% of the
violent episodes were drug-related. Id. With respect to cocaine, the users reported that the
high was generally peaceful or mellow but added that when the drug wears off, users' anxiety
and depression can promote violence. Id. at 13. Cocaine was singled out as the cause of
violence in eight of the 193 recorded violent episodes. Id. at 108. In another study measuring
drug involvement in 1988 New York homicides (DRCA-H2) psychopharmacological violence
from cocaine accounted for just one of 218 drug-related homicides. P. Ryan, P. Goldstein,
H. Brownstein & P. Belluci, Drug Related Homicides, New York City, 1988, at 20 (draft of
Drug Related Crime Analysis study, available from Narcotic and Drug Research, Inc.) [here-
inafter DRCA-H2). Surveyors collected data on 414 homicides and conservatively estimated
that 218 were drug-related. Id. at 15. DRCA-H2 and DRIVE are limited to the drug-violence
nexus, not the wider drug-crime connection.
63 See Users of Crack Cocaine Link Violence to Drug's Influence, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1989,
at All,  col. 1. Although the title implies the contrary, the poll mentioned in the article does
not differentiate between callers who claimed to commit crimes while high on cocaine and
those while high on crack. Id. atsol. 6. Almost 50% of the cocaine or crack users who called
a drug hotline in the week of November 1, 1988 admitted to committing violent crimes or
aggressive acts. Id, at col. 1. Two-thirds of that group said that they performed violent acts
while high rather than during the withdrawal stage. Id. In another study, surveyors concluded
that patients treated for psychiatric emergencies were much more likely to have violent
thoughts and actions if they had just used crack than if they had just used other types of
cocaine. Crack Smokers More Violent, Psychotic Than Other Cocaine Users, NIDA NOTES, Winter
1987-88, at 22 (Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse Newsletter) [hereinafter NIDA NOTES]. In a
study of 80 patients, these researchers found that cocaine abusers averaged less than one
"violent characteristic" while crack users experienced more than one "violent characteristic"
on average. Id.
64 Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941. Available evidence suggests that ice use may be as
likely to induce violence as crack. See, e.g., Kuipers, ICE, SPIN, Dec. 1989, at 36, 38; Hearings:
Methamphetamine, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of David Westrate, Ass't. Adm'r., DEA).
" DRIVE, supra note 56, at 13.
66 L. GRIN5PO0N & P. HEDBLOM, THE SPEED CULTURE: AMPHETAMINE USE AND ABUSE IN
AMERICA 184 (1975).
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a nonaggressive manner, 67 although users going through with-
drawal may become irritable and engage in violent behavior."
Black market crime" is a second type of drug-related crime,
Black market crime refers to crimes committed by drug traffickers
to protect the area in which they make drug transactions, to retaliate
for betrayals to the police, and to collect bad debts. 7° Crimes that
result from the existence of the black market are distinct from drug-
induced crimes and thefts committed to support drug use. 7 t
Advocates of both criminalization and legalization agree that
black market violence will diminish if legalization occurs, but the
two sides disagree about the extent of the reduction. 72 Legalization
advocates point to statistics in crime-ridden cities to demonstrate
how legalization will reduce black market murder. 73
 For example,
in a 1988 study of New York homicides, the police reported that
67 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT UNIT, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEPENDENCE, Heroin
Today: Commodity, Consumption, Control and Care, in A LAND FIT FOR HEROIN? 14 (N. Dorn &
N. South eds. 1987).
62 DRIVE, supra note 56, at 13.
fig See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 12; black market crime is also known as systemic
crime. Goldstein, supra note 57, at 497-502.
See Wisotsky, Exposing the War On Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1401. Other types of black market violence include murdering
informers, punishing those who sell weak or placebo drugs, and robbing drug dealers.
Goldstein, supra note 57, at 497.
71 See Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941. In the DRCA-H2 study, almost 40% of the 414
homicides were systemic and about three-quarters of the 219 drug-related homicides were
systemic. DRCA-H2, supra note 62, at 20. The one exception was alcohol, in which all 21
alcohol-related homicides were psychopharmacological. Id, Of the 162 systemic homicides,
100 involved crack and 45 involved cocaine. Id. at 19-20. Marijuana accounted for four
systemic homicides and heroin another two. Id, at 20. In the DRIVE study, one-quartet; of
the 193 violent episodes were systemic, and cocaine and heroin were the drugs most often
involved in systemic violence. DRIVE, supra note 56, at 108.
72
 Both sides assume that legal drug prices would be lower than current drug prices.
See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 15 (legalization advocate); cf, Bennett, A Response to Milton
Friedman, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1989, at A30, col. 4 (criminalization advocate). The black
market is more expensive than a free market because black market dealers charge high prices
as compensation for the great risks they take. Cloud, supra note 3, at 759. If, however, the
taxes on drugs in the free market make the price of drugs unnaturally high, the black market
may still be a good economic choice for buyers. Church, supra note 42, at 18.
73 See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 12; Wisotsky, supra note 70, at 1401. Legalization
advocates look to the crime rate during and after Prohibition to show that legalization will
mark the end of the black market and the violence it engenders. See, e.g., Ostrowski, supra
note 16, at 12. One proponent notes that the murder rate rose at the beginning of Prohibition
in 1920 and remained high until Congress repealed Prohibition in 1933; after repeal, the
murder rate declined for 11 consecutive years. Id. at 1. The natural inference is that boot-
legging and organized crime accounted for much of the increase in murders during the 13
years of Prohibition. See id.
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29% of those arrested for committing homicide were drug traffick-
ers and 34% of the victims were drug traffickers. 74
William Bennett, former director of the Office of National
Drug Control- Policy, admits that legalization might reduce gang
and dealer-related crime." He does not think, however, that the
black market will vanish altogether." He says that the black market
will continue to flourish unless the United States gives out drugs
both freely and openly. 77 Another writer cautions that drug legali-
zation will unwittingly create a black market in exporting drugs to
foreign markets.78
A third drug-crime connection is called economic compulsive,
in which drug users commit burglary and robbery to finance their
costly habits." One writer estimates that drug users commit at least
forty percent of all property theft in the United States to support
their habits. 8° Heroin addicts81 and crack addicts very often commit
crimes to finance their drug addictions. 82
A second justification for the drug laws is the connection be-
tween drug use and death." By one estimate, in 1985, a total of
" Hawaii State Epidemiology Work Group Conference, Meeting Summary, at 13-16
(Feb. 14, 1990) (Presentation by Paul Goldstein, Narcotic & Drug Research, Inc., regarding
drugs and violence). According to one source in Dade County, Florida, about 23% of the
homicides that occurred in 1980 were drug trafficking-related. Wisotsky, supra note 70, at
1401. Another source estimates that about 70 black market murders occur in Miami each
year. Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 12. He uses that figure and FBI data to estimate that about
750 black market murders occur nation-wide each year. Id.
75 Bennett, supra note 72, at A30, col. 5-6. Contra LEGALIZATION: IMPACT AND FEASIBIL-
ITY, supra note 1, at 4 (finding that legalization would not decrease crime).
75 Bennett, supra note 72, at A30, col. 6.
77 Id. Other opponents add that legalization will not end the black market because users
will wish to remain anonymous and a legalization act will not likely permit this. Church, supra
note 42, at 18.
70 Jarvik, supra note 51, ar7389.
Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941.
°° Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 11.
01 Id. (citing Speckart & Anglin, Narcotics and Crime: An Analysis of Existing Evidence For
a Causal Relationship, 3 BEHAV. Sc.I & L. 273 (1985)).
" See Miami Herald, Aug. 5, 1989, at Bl, col. 2. Another earlier estimate is that heroin
addicts commit one-third to one-half of all robberies in urban areas. DRIVE, supra note 56,
at 17. An estimated 50-75% of all burglaries and robberies are committed by heroin addicts
trying to maintain their habits. Rummonds, Heroin Decriminalization, NAT'L L. J., May 3, 1982,
at 14, 15. One author points to methadone maintenance programs for heroin addicts to show
that less costly drugs reduce an addict's tendency to steal. Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941.
The study shows that addicts who received drugs freely or cheaply stole less than other
addicts.
83 Richards, Drug Use and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for Decriminalization
of Certain Forms of Drug Use, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 607, 646 (1981).
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3,562 people died directly from use of illegal drugs. 84 Proponents of
continued criminalization argue that legalization would lead to an
increase in drug use and thereby an increase in deaths from over-
doses. 85
On the other hand, one researcher estimates that each year
black market factors, such as infections and allergic reactions to
street mixtures, cause as many as 2,400 deaths of cocaine and heroin
users. 86 He calculates that eighty percent of all drug deaths are
caused by prohibition and that only a fivefold increase in use after
legalization would create as many deaths as presently occur. 87 The
same authority estimates that 3,500 users die annually from using
unsterile needles, 88 and argues that legalization would allow the
United States to fight Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS") by providing clean needles to addicts at a reasonable
price.89 Some legalization proponents also draw parallels to other
societies where needles are available and the incidence of AIDS is
lower. 90
A third argument for drug criminalization concerns the addic-
tive tendencies of the illicit drugs.91 Under one variation of this
84 Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 943 (citing National Council on Alcoholism statistics).
Nadelrnann admits that unreported drug deaths may raise the number somewhat above
3,562.
There is some authority for the view that the number of drug-induced car accidents is
underestimated. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at A1, col. , 6 (report of one of the first studies
linking cocaine use to traffic fatalities); see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at A1, col. 2
(describing police efforts to detect drugged drivers).
8.5
 jarVik, supra note 51, at 389.
Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 14,
" Id. at 46. The author points out that a large proportion of drug overdoses that result
in death are accidental, caused by adulterated drugs or drugs of unknown purity. Id,
E18
89 Id.
'" See E. Engelsman, supra note 61, at 10 (8% of all 605 Dutch AIDS patients were drug
addicts as of October 1, 1988 whereas 26% of the United States AIDS patients were addicts
as of September, 1988); Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 14 (author points to Hong Kong where
needles are legal and there are no reported cases of drug-related AIDS); F. Ruter, The
Pragmatic Dutch Approach to Drug Control: Does It Work? 15 (May 25, 1988) (unpublished
paper from Drug Policy Foundation lecture) (3% of the AIDS patients in Holland are addicts
while in New York City 17% of the AIDS patients are addicts).
91 Husak, supra note 50, at 374. The term addiction is itself a subject of much contention.
See L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL EVOLUTION 176 (1985).
Grinspoon and Bakalar state that practically no consensus exists for determining when a
person is addicted to a particular drug. Further, definitions often depend on one's moral,
political and social dispositions. Another author adds that there are four separate strands of
meaning that are used to define drug addiction. Richards, supra note 83, at 655-56 (tolerance,
or the need for progressively larger doses to achieve the sameresult; physical dependence
or withdrawal; psychological dependence; and a moral judgment of drug abuse as degra-
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argument, addictive drugs should be banned because use of these
drugs may be nonvoluntary. 92 For example, initially, public warnings
suggested that a couple of hits of crack would lead directly to
addiction.93 One expert estimates that if crack is legalized, seventy
percent of those who try it will become addicts." More recently,
however, experts have begun to question how rapidly crack users
become addicts and what proportion of those who try crack become
addicted. 95
Estimates of the addictiveness of cocaine, including crack, are
also varied. One source asserts that approximately one-fourth of
dation). Satisfying the conditions of one meaning may not and often does not satisfy the
terms of the other definitions, See id. at 656. Another definition is that addiction is the
compulsive, self-destructive, chronic self-administration of a mind-altering drug. G. Velman
& V. Haddok, Brain Chemistry and the Addictions, 1 DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK,
2-13 (Oct. 1990).
92 Husak, supra note 50, at 375. According to many researchers, a problem user is a
person who uses a drug once a week or more. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 944.
An addict is a daily or nearly daily user. See, e.g., Green, supra note 10, at A1, col. 5. Other
types of addicts exist; namely, the occasional binger, and the addict who uses drugs period-
ically but obsesses about drugs constantly. Skorneck, Crack's Power to Addict Challenged, Staten
Island Advance, Jan. 29, 1990, at A3, col. 3.
93 Skorneck, supra note 92, at col. 1.
94 Church, supra note 42, at 16. Another author, Director of Research at Fair Oaks
Hospital and founder of the Cocaine Hotline refutes the idea that a substantial number of
people use crack only occasionally. Skorneck, supra note 92, at col. 3.
95 Skorneck, supra note 92, at col. 1. The director of the pharmacology department at
City University of New York Medical School states that "the idea that two hits [of crack] and
you're dead or you're addicted is not true." Id. at col. 2. Further, two studies support the
view that use of crack does not inevitably lead to crack addiction. The first study of 308
heavy drug users ranging from ages twelve to seventeen found that 96% of those surveyed
had tried crack one or more times and 30% used it daily. E. GOODE, supra note I, at 203.
Eighty-seven percent used crack regularly, and 50% used it once a week or more but not
daily. More than one-half of the daily users took one or two hits a day. Id.
In a second study, of teenagers and young adults, the Department of Health and Human
Services found that although 4.8% of high school seniors admitted they had tried crack, only
1.6% said they had used crack in the month preceding the survey. DRUG USE, DRINKING AND
SMOKING, supra note 13, at 5-6. The surveyors concluded that as many as two-thirds of those
who tried crack stopped using it, Id. According to a 1988 government survey, 1.3% of the
United States population had tried crack, .5% used crack within a year of the survey date,
but only .2% had used crack within the past month. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE
35, table 5-A (1989).
These surveys are bolstered by a study finding that half of those surveyed who had tried
crack preferred other forms of cocaine. Skorneck, supra note 92, at col. 2 (citing a study by
the Addiction Research Foundation in Toronto). Patricia Erickson, who oversaw the study,
explained that not all drug users prefer the crack rush, or high. Id. She also explained that
users' characteristics and friends may limit crack use. Finally, one source estimates that only
one of six people who try crack become addicts. Husak, supra note 50, at 378 n.60 (citing
N.Y. Times, Aug, 24, 1989, at B7, col. 1).
May 1991]	 DRUG LEGALIZATION	 587
those who try cocaine become "repeat users."• 6
 A second researcher
states that about ten percent of the cocaine-using population are
addicts,97 and a third authority estimates that relatively few cocaine
users become addicts."
Although precise numbers do not exist, statistics reveal that not
all heroin users are addicts." One author claims that the proportion
of heroin addicts to nonaddicted heroin users varies in different
cities.'°° Some researchers estimate that the nonaddict users equal
or outnumber the addicted users.'°', Further, studies reveal that
heroin addiction is neither continuous nor permanent.i° 2 Physical
dependence (a common definition of addiction) usually occurs, if
at all, within approximately six months to a year after initial use.'"
Marijuana use does not create physical dependence.'" Mari-
juana users, however, may become psychologically dependent on
marijuana.' 65 Only a portion of the twenty million Americans who
smoked marijuana in 1982 were heavy users, and one writer con-
cluded that only a fraction of the heavy users were marijuana abu-
sers. 106
96 Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 48,
97 Cloud, supra note 3, at 734.
w Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 944. This author refers to a 1986 survey conducted by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse that found that 250,000 of the 8.2 million young adults
who had tried cocaine used it once a week or more on average. Id. He concludes that only
these 250,000 young adults, comprising three percent of the user population, are "potential
problem users." Id. Results of a 1990 study based on the United States population indicate
that 1.6 million people in the United States used cocaine, including crack, once a month or
more, 662,000 were weekly users, and 336,000 were daily or nearly daily users. See Green,
supra note 10, at A26, col. 1. Using the prior author's reasoning, the 662,000 weekly users
are potential cocaine abusers.
99 See J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG 33 (1983).
100 See id. at 33-34.
OF See, e,g., id.; M, MooRE, supra note 31, at 9 (heroin addicts are a minority of all heroin
users).
102 J. KAPLAN, supra note 99, at 34. Kaplan defines "continuous" to mean that a current
addict who was an addict a year ago was addicted during that entire year. Id. "Permanence"
means that a current addict will be addicted ten or more years in the future, Id.
[09
	 HUNT & C. CHAMBERS, THE HEROIN EPIDEMICS 12 (1976).
'" See Wallenstein, Marijuana Possession as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 5 CRIM. L.
HULL 59, 61-62 (1969).
LOS See id.
108 See Slaughter, supra note 46, at 433 n.81. The American Medical Association defines
marijuana abuse as "pathological use for at least a month that causes impairment in social
or occupational functioning." Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL.
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 175-76 (3d ed. 1980)). "Pathological use" includes intoxica-
tion throughout the day, nearly daily use, and episodes of Cannabis Delusional Disorder. H.
In 1988, one-third of high school seniors had smoked marijuana in the past year but only
2.7% smoked marijuana daily. DRUG USE, DRINKING, AND SMOKING, supra note 13, at 7.
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In summary, there are three significant drug-crime connec-
tions: psychopharmacological, systemic, and economic compulsive.
With respect to psychopharmacological violence, current evidence
suggests that crack, and to a lesser extent cocaine, is somewhat likely
to induce violence in users, and heroin and marijuana will rarely
cause violent or criminal acts. Systemic violence associated with drug
trafficking is substantial. Moreover, a large percentage of all crimes
committed in the United States are the result of addicts trying to
support their habits. Drug use reportedly causes only about 3,000
deaths annually although criminalization advocates fear that the
number of deaths will increase markedly if drugs are legalized.
Estimates of the addictiveness of crack, cocaine, and heroin vary
although researchers generally agree that marijuana is not addictive
but potentially habit forming.
•	 B. Legal Drug Use and Its Effects On Society
Some proponents of drug legalization assert that all drug use,
both legal and illegal, must be attacked systematically) 07 They com-
pare the harmful effects of alcohol and tobacco to the effects of
illicit drugs,'" 8 pointing out that the social costs of alcohol and
tobacco far outweigh the costs of illegal drugs. 1 °9
Alcohol consumption has long been associated with violent be-
havior and criminal activity."° Studies conducted in 1953 and 1968
found a significant correlation between intoxication and murder)"
1" See, e.g., Nadeltnann, supra note 36, at 943. In 1986, the total cost of alcohol abuse
equaled 128.3 billion dollars. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Preface tO SEVENTH
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, at X.
108 See, e.g„ Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 943; Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 40.
1 °9 See Isikoff, Alcohol: The Worse Drug Problem, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1990, at Al, cot. 2.
Drug legalization proponents point out that alcohol and nicotine may be as addictive or more
addictive than their illicit counterparts. See, e.g., Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 48; Husak, supra
note 50, at 378 n.60. About 15 million people in the United States are alcoholics or are
alcohol-dependent. Isikoff, supra, at A9, col. 1-2. An estimated three million alcoholics are
under the age of eighteen. Anderson, A Child's Dead End Path, 67 Mimi. 13AR J. 317, 317
(Mar. 1988). Finally, several researchers claim to have found a genetic predisposition towards
alcoholism in some people. E. GOODE, supra note 1, at 56. Some studies indicate that adopted
children's rate of alcoholism more closely resembles their genetic parents' rate of alcoholism
than their adopted parents' rate of alcoholism. Id. Finally, the vast majority of people who
smoke cigarettes are addicts. Husak, supra note 50, at 378 n.60.
110 See E. GOODE, supra note 1, at 118.
"' Id. at 118. The 195'3 study found that 60% of all murders were committed by persons
who had been drinking. The 1968 study found that 53% of the murders reviewed were
committed by pedpke who had been drinking. Id. Further, drunkenness has been linked to a
large percentage of sexual crimes. Id.; see also S. RADISH, S. SCIIULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 955 (5th ed. 1989) (citing Moore, Legal Responsibility and
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In addition to this correlation between violent crime and alcohol,
alcohol leads to hundreds of thousands of deaths each year.'" To-
bacco, meanwhile, causes nearly 400,000 deaths each year." 3 More-
over, a government study demonstrated that exposure to passive
cigarette smoke significantly increases a non-smoker's likelihood of
developing lung cancer.' 14 Finally, because of the widespread harms
that alcohol and tobacco use cause, many legalization proponents
suggest that the legal status of these drugs is at odds with the illegal
status of other drugs.
With respect to the practical rationale for legalizing drugs,
advocates on both sides of the legalization debate use different data
to support their arguments. For example, the crucial drug-crime
connection breaks down into psychopharmacological crime, sys-
temic crime, and economic compulsive crime."' Different drugs
have varying potential for leading to or contributing to each of
these three types of crime, and some of this crime may be caused
by the drug laws themselves. Next, the drug-death connection is
also susceptible to contrary interpretation. Some advocates assert
that legalization will lead to an increase in overdoses while others
conclude that, because the black market causes so many overdoses,
legalization will diminish the number of drug-related deaths. Fi-
nally, the concept of addiction, also critical to any discussion of drug
legalization, defies easy description. Most significantly, the addic-
tiveness of the high profile illicit drugs is at issue.
Chronic Alcoholism, l'22 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 748, 753 (1966)) (Cincinnati study showing a high
correlation between drinking of alcohol and felonies).
The Department of Justice's 1983 statistics indicate that 54% of all prison inmates
convicted of violent crimes admitted they had used alcohol just before they committed their
crimes. Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 941 (citing BUREAU OF f us .rick; STATts .rics, U.S. DEPT.
OF jusTIcF., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATis-rics 398 (1986)). A study released by
the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") found that 46% of the nation's homicides in 1987
were alcohol-related. Isikoff, supra note 109, at col. 2-3.
115 The CDC study states that alcohol contributed to over 100,000 deaths in the United
States in 1987 alone. Isikoff, supra note 109, at A4, col. 1. This statistic is comprised chiefly
of alcohol diseases, traffic deaths, and suicides. Id. at col. 1-2. Another study places the
number of deaths directly or indirectly attributable to alcohol between 50,000 and 200,000
a year. Nadelmann, supra note 36, at 943. A third study suggests that alcohol causes 150,000
deaths a year. Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 47.
"3 Jonas, Fight New Enemies in the War on Drugs, NF:WSUAY, Feb. 20, 1990, at 45, col. 2.
114 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE 10 (1986). The
report states that the risk of cancer is 30% greater for non-smoking spouses of smokers than
couples where neither spouse smokes. Id. Another source reports that about 12,000 people
each year die from cancer caused by passive smoke. Jonas, supra note 113, at 45, col. 2.
115 See supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
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Despite the practical reasons for criminalizing drugs, some cri-
minalization advocates accept arguendo that legalization might have
a beneficial impact in a vacuum, but doubt whether any legalization
scheme can be implemented to resolve the problems that legaliza-
tion advocates address." 6 The criminalization proponents argue
that legalization will not eliminate black market violence, and they
consider legalization, which will reduce the price of drugs while
increasing purity and access, an illogical way to reduce the demand
for drugs."' These critics query whether all drugs will be legal;
whether anyone, or only addicts, will be allowed to buy drugs le-
gally; and whether age limits will be imposed." 8
There have been a wide range of responses to this type of
inquiry. One writer offers no concrete plan but implies that legali-
zation of all drugs is appropriate." 9 Other commentators suggest
experimenting with legalization, initially decriminalizing marijuana
only.' 20 A third proponent, Judge Robert Sweet, suggests that only
addicts, who register and give fingerprints, will be able to buy drugs
in government-licensed stores. Under Sweet's scheme, however,
crack addicts will not receive unlimited doses.' 2 '
Steven Brill, an opponent of legalization, criticizes Sweet's ap-
proach by stating that a failure to give unlimited quantities will
maintain the black market for crack.' 22 Moreover, Brill generally
criticizes all legalization schemes by asking how they will prevent a
black market for underage drug users, and whether pregnant
women will be permitted to use drugs. 123 Brill claims that he cannot
envision any legalization scheme that will diminish, no less eliminate,
the black market.' 24 In fact, Brill states that legalization's only result
will be to increase the availability of drugs while decreasing the
moral stigma that currently deters some people from using drugs. ' 25
118 See, e.g., Raspberry, Legalizing Drugs: Let's Get Specific, Wash. Post, Nov. 1,1989, at
A25, col. 1; Brill, supra note 1, at 48.
117 Raspberry, supra note 116, at A25, col. 5.
118 See LEGALIZATION: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, supra note 1, at 2; Brill, supra note 1, at
48-50.
119 See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 35-36.
12° See, e.g., Trebach Interview, supra note 32, at 14; Brill, supra note 1, at 49.
121 Brill, supra note 1, at 49.
122 Id.
1" Id.
124 Id.
1" Id. A common response to the claim that the so called war on drugs is not being won
is that the United States has not even begun to fight such a war. See, e.g., LEGALIZATION:
IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, supra note 1, at 1 (statement by Sen. Rangel); Brill, supra note 1, at
48 (statement by Manhattan District Attorney that "we haven't tried enforcement, so how do
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II. ETHICAL THEORIES AND DRUG LEGALIZATION
Beyond these practical arguments against legalization, many
commentators claim that moral beliefs help explain societal oppo-
sition to drug legalization.' 26 For example, in the 1988 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, Congress stressed that legalization would constitute an
"unconscionable" surrender in the war on drugs. 127 This note now
examines three well-known ethical theories to evaluate whether it
is morally permissible for society to declare drug use illegal merely
because it thinks such use is immoral.
The legal moralism theory espoused by Lord Devlin is the first
of these theories.' 28 In the Enforcement of Morals, Devlin argues that
the criminal law is designed to prevent harm to individuals and,
more importantly, the public.' 2 • Devlin's theory would therefore
support continued criminalization of all illicit drugs.
The second major theory is John Rawls's deontological theory
of morals,'" which David A.J. Richards applied to the drug legali-
we know if it will work"). According to this view, more money is needed to enforce the drug
laws and increase drug treatment. facilities. Brill, supra note I, at 50. One suggestion for
simultaneously improving enforcement and treatment is to drug test all arrestees and make
treatment a condition of release. See id. at 51. Other suggestions include pilot studies to
compare the efficacy of interdiction strategies (that try to reduce drug supply) to strategies
aimed at reducing demand fin. drugs (treatment and prevention), voluntary drug testing for
all citizens, and beepers that drug abusers would wear to alert officials if drug use occurs,
Jarvik, supra note 51, at 390-91.
A second approach; espoused by James Hall, executive director of the Up Front Drug
Information Center, suggests that the current level of criminal deterrence be maintained but
that it be supplemented by "medical/health, educational, social, community, family, employer,
and religious answers." Hall, Victory in the War on Drugs, STREET PHARMACOLOGIST NEWSLET-
TER, May/June 1988, at 1. Hall explains that the government traditionally captures about
10% of all illicit drugs in the United States. Thus, he states that law enforcement represents
the 10% solution to drug abuse. Hall maintains that treatment and health responses to reduce
demand can and should eliminate the 90% of drug abuse that law enforcement misses. He
argues that, with education, treatment, and other non-law-related efforts at the forefront,
and law enforcement as the backstop, the war on drugs can be won. Id.
1" See Richards, supra note 83, at 608; Wallenstein, supra note 104, at 73. Richards notes
that it may be necessary to persuade the American public that drug use is nut immoral before
the public will accept drug legalization. Richards claims that the arguments linking drug use
with crime and death are after-the•fact justifications for moralistic and paternalistic beliefs.
Richards, supra note 83, at 647.
12 ' 1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4296.
128 See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). Feinberg calls Devlin's theory
"legal moralism." J. Feinberg, Hard Cases for the Harm Principle, in MORALITY AND THE LAW
56 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1988). Feinberg notes that Devlin's legal moralism theory
is one variation of the public harm theory. Id.
12U Feinberg, supra note 128, at 56. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text for a
discussion of' Devlin's explanation of the purpose of criminal law.
1" See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Deontological theorists posit the existence
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zation issue.' 3 ' Richards argues that Rawls's deontological theory
favors legalizing some drugs that are currently illegal) 32
The third theory, John Stuart Mill's harm principle, limits so-
cietal and governmental involvement in an individual's decisions) 33
In On Liberty, Mill states that the law should interfere with an
individual's liberty only when doing so will prevent harm to other
identifiable individuals of that society.' 34 Mill's harm principle would
appear to favor legalization of some currently illicit drugs. 136
A. Devlin's Public Harm Theory
Lord Devlin devised his version of the public harm theory in
1957) 36 Devlin's argument has three parts. First, he argues that a
shared public morality is fundamental to the continued existence of
a civilized society and that private immorality can threaten this
public morality.'" Next, Devlin argues that a society can legitimately
prohibit an act merely by showing that the act is thought injurious
to society) 38 Finally, his theory explains how individual rights limit
the number of situations in which the criminal law should prohibit
immoral conduct.'"
Devlin first explains that a public morality does exist on certain
basic subjects.'" Devlin argues that a society is, by definition, a
group of people who share common ideas."' These ideas are not
only political but also moral ideas about how its members should
of inviolable human rights by arguing that humans have autonomy and must be treated as
equals. Richards, supra note 83, at 617.
"' Richards, supra note 83, at 607. See infra notes 218-55 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Richards's application of Rawls's theory to drug legalization.
1 " See infra note 221-22 and accompanying text.
1 " IS. MILL, ON LIBER'T'Y 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974).
1 " Id. In using the term "harm," Mill primarily meant physical harm. P, DEVLIN, supra
note 128, at 104.
135 See J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 165.
13" See P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 1. Devlin devised this theory in response to a report
by the Committee on Homosexual offenses and Prostitution known as the Wolfendon Report.
The Wolfendon Report suggested that homosexual acts in private between consenting adults
should no longer constitute a criminal offense in England. P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 2.
Devlin initially agreed with the Wolfendon Report conclusions but reversed his view before he
wrote The Enforcement of Morals. Id. at vi—vii.
1" See id. at 13.
"8 Id. at 17. It is worth noting that although The Enforcement of Morals focuses on
homosexuality and prostitution, Devlin intended his public harm theory to articulate the
scope of the state's power to legislate against alleged immorality in general. Id. at 12.
199 Id. at 15.
"9 See id. at 10.
1 4,
 Id. at 9.
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order their lives.' 42 He uses the institution of monogamous marriage
to illustrate his point. Marriage, he suggests, is fundamental to the
existence of English society. He postulates that if common moral
precepts such as monogamous marriage disappear, English society
will be in danger of collapse.'" The danger of collapse exists, Devlin
argues, because the individuals who form a society reach a funda-
mental agreement about good and evil that allows a society to enjoy
health and longevity. i 44 If this common understanding of good and
evil is not preserved, society dissolves.'"
After trying to demonstrate that a public morality exists on
certain subjects, Devlin argues that society can enforce some public
morals through the criminal law.'" If a public morality exists, he
thinks it is beyond doubt that society has the right to preserve that
moral code by enshrining it in law. 147 Devlin claims that society can
legitimately enforce laws against homosexual acts for the same rea-
sons that it can enforce laws against treason—both laws are pro-
mulgated to ensure the survival of society. 148
Although Devlin asserts that, theoretically, society's power to
preserve its moral code through law can have no limits,'" he rec-
ognizes that certain limits are advisable. For instance, respect for
individual freedom and privacy militate against allowing society to
force all of its moral views on every citizen.' 5° Furthermore, Devlin
points out that the criminal law enforces minimum rather than
maximum expectations. L51
He advocates toleration of the greatest amount of personal
liberty that does not threaten the perpetuation of the public mo-
rality.' 52 Devlin contends that only immoral acts that are intolerable
threaten the public moral code.'" Devlin asserts that an act or
142 Id.
143 Id. at 10.
149 Id.
' 45 Id.
146 See id. at 11.
145 Id. Devlin makes a related point about how society knows what its moral views actually
are on a given subject. See id. at 14. Legislators discern the moral sentiments of their
constituents by using the reasonable or right-minded person standard. Id. at 15. Devlin
envisions a jury coming down with a verdict about whether a particular act violates the public
morality. See id.
' 4 ' See id. at 13.
," Id. at 12.
153 Id. at 15,
151 Id. at 19.
152 Id. at 16.
155 Id. at 17.
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practice is intolerable and may be outlawed if the public views that
act with "intolerance, indignation, and disgust."'"
Philosophers have criticized Devlin's theory. H.L.A. Hart, for
example, agrees with Devlin that a society's morality and criminal
law ought to mirror one another regarding matters such as murder
and theft.' 55 Hart asserts, however, that certain immoral acts might
lie beyond the scope of the law because although they prompt public
"intolerance, indignation, and disgust," they do not threaten soci-
ety.' 5" Hart also repudiates Devlin's conception of the moral fabric
by denying that all of morality forms a "seamless web," so that those
who disobey any part of the popular code, be it ever so slight, are
likely to transgress the rest as well.' 57
Hart discusses the comparison Devlin made between the cri-
minalization of treason and homosexual acts to prove his point
about the lack of connection between certain immoral acts and the
dissolution of society.' 58 Hart argues that to accept, on moral
grounds, Devlin's analogy between the need to enforce treason laws
and the need to enforce laws against private homosexuality is to
accept the statement that non-compliance with any part of the public
moral code leads to the code's destruction rather than its revision.' 59
Hart stresses that the evidence does not support this viewpoint. 160
He argues that people will not begin to condone murder, lying, and
theft merely because the homosexual acts that they abhor escape
criminal sanction.'"'
Hart's final criticism of the public harm theory encompasses a
discussion of what he calls moral conservatism.' 62 Moral conserva-
tism, Hart says, suggests that the unchanging nature of a moral
code, whatever that code may be, is itself a moral value that justifies
the legal enforcement of that code.' 63 Hart denounces moral con-
servatism because he thinks that using coercion to perpetuate a
51
115 Hart, Immorality and Treason, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 50 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum
eds. 1988).
151; See Id.
157 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBLRTY, AND MORALITY 50-51 (1963). Hart invented the term
"seamless web" to describe Devlin's theory about how people create moral beliefs.
15 '7 See Hart, supra note 155, at 51.
1 "9 Id. at 51.
itio
16 ' Id.
162 H.L.A. HART, supra note 157, at 72.
ins Id.
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moral code hinders the process of moral modification that gives
social institutions their value)"
In The Enforcement of Morals, Devlin responds to Hart's critique
of his theory) 65 He argues that it misinterprets his view to say that
any deviation from the common morality threatens a society's ex-
istence)" Rather, Devlin says that deviation may potentially
threaten society and is therefore within the purview of legal enact-
ments) 67 He points to history to show that the dissolution of "moral
bonds" is often the first step to the destruction of a society)G8
In addition, Devlin says that Hart's "seamless web" terminology
inaccurately describes his understanding of how people maintain
their moral beliefs.'• Devlin states that "for most people morality
is a web of beliefs, rather than a number of unconnected ories." 17"
Although he acknowledges that this interconnected understanding
of morality may be irrational, he thinks people actually do compre-
hend their moral belief's as a whole. 17 '
Devlin also rejects Hart's suggestion that the legal enforcement
of public morality means that moral values remain static)" He
claims that a sufficient number of strongly voiced opinions will tend
to bring about a change in the law)" He recognizes that changing
the popular view on a subject, such as homosexuality, requires
zealous advocacy and entails a willingness to fight and perhaps to
suffer)" The law reflects society's changing moral opinions, 175 and
if a change in opinion by a sufficient number does not cause the
law to change, the law will be broken.' 76 He acids that in democratic
societies like England, the tendency will be for the law to change
before it is broken) 77
I " Id. at 75.
165 P. DEVLIN, SUP-IT/ note 128, at 13 n.l.
16 Id.
167 Id.
169 Id. at 13. Devlin does not give any specific historical examples.
169 Id. at 115.
17G Id.
171 Id.
' 72 See id.
173 Id. at 116. John Stuart Mill referred to this method of moral reform as both un-
economical and ungenerous. See Feinberg, supra note I28, at 57-58.
174 P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 116.
175 See id.
176 Id.
' 77 Id. One author suggests Ihat under Devlin's conception of law mirroring morality,
moral opinion changes only by first breaking the law. Feinberg, supra note 128, at 57.
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Ronald Dworkin also criticized Devlin's public harm theory.'"
In his critique, Dworkin assumes that Devlin is correct—that society
can protect the public environment from what the preponderance
of its members condemn on moral principle—but finds that Devlin's
argument still fails because it misconstrues the meaning of morally
principled disapproval.'" Dworkin criticizes Devlin's explanation of
how the criminal law and public morality should coincide because
he finds this idea at the heart of many theories that relate law and
morals.'"
Dworkin altogether excludes from the realm of moral reasons
prejudice, personal emotional reactions, factually incorrect ration-
alizations, and attempts to create a moral reason merely by showing
that others have a similar belief. 18 ' Dworkin asserts that feelings
and emotions cannot alone create a moral position on any subject."2
Dworkin attacks Devlin's argument precisely because Devlin wants
legislators to rely on society's moral consensus on an issue, which is
to be formed primarily by that society's feelings.'" Dworkin recalls
Devlin's statement that "the ordinary man whose opinions we must
enforce is not expected to reason about anything and his judgment
may be largely a matter of feeling."'" Dworkin asserts that Devlin's
understanding of morality is wrong because it fails to separate truly
moral reasons from mere prejudice, irrational factual assumptions,
and personal hatred.' 85
In summary, Devlin argues that a public morality exists. Society
has the right to enforce this morality, he claims, when it feels that
a failure to do so might lead to its own destruction. He asserts that
society's moral code, and therefore its very existence, is endangered
when private immoral acts instill in its citizens feelings of "intoler-
ance, indignation, and disgust." When these feelings do not exist,
Devlin says that respect for individual freedom and liberty allow
private immoral acts to be unaffected by the criminal law. Even so,
Devlin points out that laws may change to reflect new limits of moral
According to Feinberg, only by practicing one's illegal moral beliefs in public can the moral
minority effect change of the law. See id.
' 78 R. qWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240 (1977).
119 Id. Dworkin acknowledges that there is much room for quarreling with each of
Devlin's subarguments but he chooses to bypass them. Id.
1 " Id. at 248,
1 " Id. at 249-50.
187 Id. at 252.
l" Id. at 253-54 (quoting P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 15.)
184 Id. at 254.
185 Id.
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toleration after citizens display earnest attempts to influence soci-
ety's opinion.
B. Rawls's Deontological Moral Theory and Richards's Application of
that Theory to Drug Legalization
In 1971, John Rawls provided a unique explication of contrac-
tarian moral theory in A Theory of Justice.' 86 According to Rawls,
justice is the foundation of any social institution.' 87 Rawls's goal is
to devise a systematic theory of justice apart from and superior to
utilitarianism.'" Rawls creates his moral theory by hypothesizing
human beings who must agree on fundamental rules of justice that
will govern all future disputes.'" Rawls calls this formative point of
social creation the "original position." 19° In the "original position,"
a "veil of ignorance" covers the individuals who vote on these rules
of justice.' 9 ' In other words, they do not know whether they are
aristocratic or working class, wealthy or poor, intelligent or dim-
witted.' 92 The voters' sole factual knowledge in the "original posi-
tion" is that their society is governed by the principles of justice
they choose and the implications of those rules.'" Because none of
the voters know their place in society, Rawls asserts that all voters
will find it is in their self-interest to choose rules of justice that are
the result of fair bargaining.I 94
Having established that the "veil of ignorance" is likely to pro-
duce rules of justice in a fair manner, Rawls tries to envision the
reasoning that the voters will employ.'" Based on this reasoning,
he formulates the rules of justice themselves.' Rawls argues that,
although members of a society have unique rational plans, each
186 J. RAWLS, supra note 130.
187 Id. at 3.
18' Id. at viii. For a definition of utilitarianism, see infra note '258.
189 Id. at 13. Rawls's premise is a form of the social contract theory espoused by Locke,
Rousseau and Kant. See id. at 11. According to Rawls's understanding of social contract
theory, individuals create the basic structure of society with the rules of justice as the aim of
the original contract. Id.
1 " See id. at 17.
' 9 ' Id. at 12.
192 Id.
1 " Id. at 137. Voters are expected to know general facts about human society such as
economic theory, politics and anything else that their choice of principles of justice will affect.
Id,
194 Id. at 12.
195 See id. at 60.
LM See U. at 60-61.
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person requires a basic amount of the "primary goods" to attain his
or her more complex ends."' Rawls loosely defines these primary
goods as "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income
and wealth."' 98 Rawls claims that, regardless of their specific plans,
all people prefer more of these goods than less." Rawls supposes
that more primary goods increase people's chances of achieving
their larger, more diverse plans. 20°
Rawls stresses that self-respect is a critical primary good. 20 ' Self-
respect, for Rawls, exists when individuals believe that their rational
goals are worth carrying out and that they are capable of achieving
those goals.202 Persons in the "original position," Rawls maintains,
will likely vote to ensure that the principles of justice protect self-
respect.203 Rawls claims that because his moral principle better jus-
tifies the need for self-esteem than other moral principles, voters
in the "original position" have good reason to adopt it. 264
Because people desire the maximum number and amount of
primary goods but do not know their position in life, each person,
Rawls believes, votes for rules of justice that ensure equal liberty,
equal opportunity, and equal distributions of income and wealth
for all individuals. 2°5 On further reflection, though, after voters
apply the rules of justice, they realize that unequal distributions of
such things as wealth and income should be tolerated as long as
every individual is comparatively better off than he or she was
before the unequal distribution. 206
Thus, Rawls states two principles of justice that he thinks voters
covered by the "veil of ignorance" in the "original position" will
adopt. First, "[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
197
 Id. at 93.
194
 Id.at 92.
199 Id. at 93.
200
 Id, at 92.
20k Id. at 440.
202 a
202
2G'4 Id.
265 Id. at 150-51.
266 Id. at 151. Rawls describes the "maximin" rule for choice under uncertainty to create
a more systematic proof of the reasoning that will lead to the fundamental principles of
justice. See id. at 152. The maximin rule says that when outcomes are uncertain, it is logical
to choose a course of action whose worst possible outcome is preferable to the worst possible
outcome of other possible courses of action. Id. at 152-53. Although Rawls admits that the
maximin solution is not the optimum way to make choices that have uncertain outcomes, in
certain settings, such as where the "veil of ignorance" exists, the maximin rule is attractive.
Id. at 153.
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extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all." 207 Second, "[s]ocial and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent. with the just
savings principle, 2°8 and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." 2 °•
Further, Rawls states that the first principle of justice must be
satisfied before the second can be applied.m In accordance with
the first principle, liberty can be restricted only for the sake of other
types of liberty.2 " This restriction might. occur in two situations:
when a less extensive liberty strengthens the system of liberty en-
joyed by all; and when less than equal liberty for all is accepted by
those with lesser liberty. 212 In the first situation, the individual in
the "original position" must find that this reduction in liberty in-
creases his or her overall freedom. 2 " The second situation arises
when those with less liberty are satisfied because their remaining
liberties are better protected. 214
In 1981, David Richards analyzed Rawls's theory to explain
why criminalization of some drugs is immora1. 215 According to Rich-
ards, Rawls's deontological theory stems from an understanding of
autonomy as the right to choose and revise one's own ends. 216
Richards interprets autonomy as a primary good—a good worth
pursuing for its own sake. 217 Richards maintains that Rawls's theory,
by accepting that human beings as rational agents can plan and
207 Id, at 302.
2°a Rawls describes the just savings principle as the requirement that, in addition to each
generation maintaining society's gains, and maintaining its just institutions, each generation
must also put aside a sufficient amount of real capital investment. Id. at 285. In brief, the
just savings principle addresses the problem of justice between generations. Id. at 284.
225 Id.
212 Id. at 302.
211 Id.
212 Id.
215 Id. at 244.
saa Id.
21" See Richards, supra note 83, at 617 (citing J. RAWLS, supra note 130.) Richards also
uses the views of Alan Gewirdi to explicate the basic deontological framework of morality.
Id, at 622-23.
2 u 1 Id. at 617.
2" Id. at 617. Rawls defines the good as the system of ends that is rational for an
individual to pursue under reasonably favorable circumstances. J. RAwts, supra note 130, at
395. Furthermore, Rawls specifically disassociates his deontological moral theory from the
definition of the word deontological, which entails characterizing the rightness or wrongness
of actions independent of their consequences Id. at 30. His theory definitely takes conse-
quences into account. See id.
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achieve their goals, treats all human beings as equals. 218 Treating
people as equals consists of treating the goals of each person with
equal concern and respect.'" Richards argues that deontological
theory permits interference with an individual's rational plans only
when those plans conflict with the autonomy of another person. 22°
Using deontological moral theory, Richards seeks to demon-
strate that use of some drugs is moral. He argues that much drug
use that is currently illicit should be legalized. 22 ' The deontological
understanding of autonomy, he argues, allows individuals to act to
further their rational goals and to assume responsibility for the
realization of their ends. 222 Richards insists that the only moral
values that ought to be enforced by the criminal law are those that
protect the higher-order rational interests at little cost. 22' Higher-
order rational interests include non-maleficence (not harming or
doing evil to others), mutual aid (when it is safe to provide aid),
and respect for others' privacy. 224 Richards claims that, under the
deontological theory, drug legalization is appropriate because treat-
ing persons as equals imposes limits on society's right to enforce
public morality. 225
In light of the deontological conception of morality, Richards
analyzes several arguments against drug legalization and finds each
one unpersuasive. 226 First, Richards analyzes the argument that
215 Richards, supra note 83, at 619. Explicit in Rawls's understanding of rational agents
is that all such agents will try to further their own self-interest. J. RAWLS, supra note 130, at
142.
215 Richards, supra note 83, at 619. Rawls denies that a loss or reduction of freedom of
one individual can be justified by increasing the good of other individuals. J. RAWLS, supra
note 130, at 3-4.
2" Richards, supra note 83, at 625.
221 See id. at 609. Richards never explicitly states which drugs should be legalized. He
implies that marijuana and LSD should be legal and remarks that speed should perhaps be
illegal. He is silent on the status of cocaine. (Crack was not a problem in 1981 when Richards
wrote this article.) Richards also explains that a moral right to use drugs does not imply that
people should take drugs. Id. at 677.
222 Id. at 622. Richards suggests that drugs that lead to violent behavior can be outlawed.
See id. at 671 n.418. He mentions methamphetamine as a likely candidate for continued
criminalization because he has been told that speed users sometimes experience violent and
hyperactive episodes. He does not include cocaine in his footnote of violence-inducing drugs
that he perceives as potential candidates for continued prohibition.
222 Id. at 654.
224 Id, at 654 & n.313.
225 Id. at 673-74.
226 Id. at 643. Richards criticizes four practical arguments that favor criminalization: 1)
drug use increases crime; 2) drug laws control illness and injury; 3) drugs or the effects they
have on society are intrinsically immoral; and 4) drugs are self-destructive. Id. For a detailed
analysis of the first argument, see notes 56-82 and accompanying text. The second argument
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drug use is degrading. 227 Proponents of this argument state that
human beings should maintain a high level of self-contro1. 228 Rich-
ards defines degradation as falling below some applicable standard
of self-contro1. 229 He states that those who favor this argument
underestimate the human propensity for self-control; he notes that,
applying the same reasoning, sexual intercourse for any reason
other than procreation is improper. 23" The oversight in this argu-
ment, he maintains, is the failure to realize that just as people have
sexual intercourse for varied reasons, individuals choose to use
drugs for a variety of reasons including therapy, recreation, relax-
ation, stimulation, and imaginative exploration. 23 I Richards argues
that the deontological argument suggests that humans rationally
choose their actions to achieve their goals and desires. 232 To suggest
that a drug user is degrading himself is to assume that his decision
to use drugs is irrational. 233 Richards considers this conclusion er-
roneous.234
Richards next analyzes a variation of the moral degradation
argument that focuses exclusively on the addictive tendencies of
some drugs. 236 According to this argument, addictive drugs should
be outlawed because addiction causes the individual to lose certain
fundamental abilities that all moral beings possess. 235 Richards
points out that researchers have postulated at least four different
definitions of drug addiction and that it is no simple task to cate-
gorize a user as an addict."'
Because physical dependence on a drug does not always lead
to or include psychological reliance on a drug, Richards questions
whether it is possible to be certain that use of a particular drug in
itself leads to addiction. 238 He points out that social and psychological
is indirectly discussed. See notes 83-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of drugs and
crime. Only the third and fourth arguments are discussed in this note. See id. at 647.
222 Id. at 648.
228 Id,
299 Id,
2" Id. at 649.
231 Id. at 649-50.
232 See id, at 619.
293 Id. at 650.
294
2" See id. at 654. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of
addiction.
2" Id. at 654.
232 Id. at 655-56. See supra note 91 for a discussion of the four different definitions of
addiction.
298 Id. at 657,
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factors affect individual drug experiences and overall use pat-
terns. 289 He suggests that these factors contribute to the addiction
of users. 24°
Lastly, Richards criticizes the paternalistic rationale for drug
criminalization. 24 ' Richards's description of the paternalistic argu-
ment is that drug use is irrational and that laws should be enacted
to protect people from their irrational ends. 242 Richards begins his
critique of paternalism by pointing out that when conduct tradi-
tionally seen as immoral begins to gain moral support, those who
retain the traditional moral understanding often argue as a last
resort that the new view is irrational. 245 Those who make the pater-
nalism argument against drug use, Richards continues, substitute
their own ends for the ends of those who choose to use drugs. 244
Richards maintains that paternalism aimed at drug use occurs be-
cause it is easier for people to impose their personal views on others
than it is to see how others look at a situation. 245 Deontological
theory supports the idea that individuals' own motives for actions
are presumed to be rational.246
Richards acknowledges that some circumstances might justify
paternalistic laws. 247 When individuals are truly acting irrationally,
it is permissible to intervene for their own good. 248 According to
Richards, the intervenor must know the individual's goal and must
be able to demonstrate empirically that the individual's chosen
course of action cannot achieve that goal. 249 Further, intervention
is appropriate only when the individual has insufficient time to learn
2]9 Id. Richards discusses the traits that the majority of heroin addicts possess including
low economic status, a lack of occupational skills, and a dependent-type personality. Id.
249 Id. Notwithstanding these questions about addiction, Richards concedes that if drug
use or addiction impairs one's ability to do one's duty, such as a parent's duty to care for his
or her child, regulation by law of drug use is proper. See id. at 660-61.
241 Id. at 667.
242 Id. at 667; see J. RAWLS, supra note 130, at 249. Familiar examples of paternalistic
laws include seat belt laws, laws against suicide, and laws prohibiting euthanasia.
2" Id. Richards suggests that the paternalism argument aimed against drug use makes
just such a proclamation. See id. at 668.
244 Id. Hart offers a paternalistic concerti for the well-being of people as a possible
justification for the laws against the use and sale of illicit substances rather than finding the
basis for legitimate enforcement solely on the grounds of the perceived immorality of drug
use. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 157, at 33.
"s Id.
246 J. RAWLS, supra note 130, at 248.
2" Richards, supra note 83, at 668.
249 Id.
249 Id.
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from his or her irrational experience. 250 Richards maintains that it
is impermissible to interfere with a person's acts to further values
that the person is not interested in furthering. 251
Richards concludes that paternalism cannot justify laws against
drug use. 252 He claims that drug use is rational in the proper setting
and context. 2" At most, Richards accepts that paternalism based on
a neutral idea of the good may dictate regulation of drug use to
limit the risks that drugs will be used irrationally. 254
In sum, Richards analyzes drug legalization from the deonto-
logical framework of justice and morality, concluding that some
drug use should be legal. Addressing several of the more common
moral arguments against legalization, he concludes that the ideal of
self-control is laudable but is inappropriate as a model for law. He
also uses the deontological model to explain why paternalistic laws
about drug use are inappropriate.255
25°
 Id, at 669.
"' Id.
252 See id. at 670.
255 Id.
254 Id. at 678. He reviews several legalization schemes to determine which one or ones
best ensure that decisions to use drugs are rational and autonomously made. See id, at 678-
84. He does not offer one definite, comprehensive legalization scheme. He assumes a legal-
ization scheme where all criminal prohibitions are removed. Id. at 678.
255 Alan Gewirth raises several objections to the deontological theory that Rawls created
and Richards's theory largely depends on. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 108 (1978).
Gewirth denies that the 'original position" and the "veil of ignorance" accurately portray a
rational attempt to arrive at principles of justice. Id. He admits that Rawls's "veil of ignorance"
allows human beings as rational, self-interested actors to choose egalitarian moral principles.
He argues, however, that it is non-rational to deny information to the people in the "original
position" concerning their economic and social status. According to Gewirth, not all people
are created with equal mental and physical abilities or equal opportunities. For Gewirth,
Rawls's "veil of ignorance" creates a situation that irrationally exceeds the uncertain nature
of the facts with which rational beings are faced when making uncertain decisions. Id. at
108-09.
John Finnis criticizes Rawls's "arbitrary" choice of liberty, opportunity, wealth, and self-
respect as the primary goods. J. FINN1S, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL Rioters 106 (1980).
Rawls explains that he excludes health, intelligence and imagination because they are natural
goods, only indirectly controlled by the basic social structure of a society. j, RAWLS, supra
note 130, at 62. Finnis uses anthropological studies that suggest that all cultures share certain
features to support the proposition that there are a certain minimum number of primary
goods and that the number exceeds Rawls's list. j, F1NN1S, supra at 82-83. The list of primary
goods indicates that all societies value human life, procreation, the need for restraint on
sexual matters, such as laws against incest, an appreciation of the truth, and an understanding
of the need for play. Id. at 83.
Finnis argues that Rawls does not and cannot provide a satisfactory reason for limiting
the definition of human good in this way. Id. at 106. Finnis maintains that those who plan
out their lives without considering basic forms of human good such as truth, friendship, or
play are justly accused of being irrational. Id.
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C. Mill's Harm Principle and Drug Legalization
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill enunciates the harm principle,
which draws a line between individual conduct that society can
rightfully control through law and individual conduct with which
the law cannot properly interfere. 256 Mill begins his famous text by
stating the harm principle, which he promises will establish the
proper limits of societal control over individual conduct. 257 Mill
argues that the harm principle properly judges the extent of social
control of human action because, utility, 258 based on the "permanent
interests of man as a progressive being," is best satisfied when
individual freedom is restrained only if such freedom causes harm
to another being. 259 In Mill's view, society benefits by allowing peo-
ple to control their own lives instead of allowing others to control
them.260
256 J.S. MILL, SUPra note 133, at 68. One commentator noted that Mill mainly was using
the harm principle to try to demonstrate that liberty and individuality should be the definitive
determinants of social policy more than means to other ends, such as truth or morality.
Himmelfarb, Introduction to J.S. MILL supra note 133, at 31.'Himmelfarb points out that some
critics think Mill based the harm principle, with its limits on societal intervention in individual
conduct, on the premise that to do so would increase individuals' overall utility. Id. at 30.
251
 Id. at 68. Mill states:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise or even right.
Id.
There are two important addenda to the harm principle. First, the harm principle is not
based on a theory of abstract right. Id. at 69-70. It is grounded solely by concerns for utility,
based on the permanent interests of the individual as an evolving being. Id. at 70. Second,
the harm principle does not apply to primitive cultures or to those people whom the law
considers children. Id. at 69. Mill states that people can benefit from the free exchange of
contrary opinions only after a certain point of human development.
255
 For Mill, utility meant that, in deciding whether to perform an action, one should
balance the pleasures and pains that were the consequences of that action and to act to create
the greatest pleasure. Schneewincl, John Stuart Mill, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PH1LosoPuiv 320
(1967).
259 J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 70,
269 Id. at 72. Mill explains in great detail why permitting unpopular opinions on all
subjects, whether ultimately correct or incorrect, is necessary. See id. at 75-118. if the
unpopular opinion is in fact correct, it needs to be heard because otherwise, Mill argues, the
truth will never emerge. Mill states that acting on the majority opinion is justified only
because of the willingness to allow others to contradict that opinion and attempt to prove
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Mill acknowledges, however, that a distinction must be made
between the type of individual dissent tolerated in opinion and that
which is permissible in action. 26 ' Aside from barring actions that
cause harm to others, Mill nullifies those acts that work a perpetual
end to an individual's liberty such as selling oneself into slavery. 262
Mill explains that freedom does not include the capacity to rid
oneself voluntarily of one's freedom.'"
Apart from these general limitations, Mill argues that individ-
ual actions should be as free as individual opinions. 264
 Mill states
that different lifestyles should be permitted, if not encouraged, as
long as humankind remains imperfect. 26' Mill argues that individ-
uality is not usually seen as an intrinsic value or a requirement of
well-being. 266
 He says that, although people profess that original
that it is mistaken. Id. at 79. To refuse to hear the opposing view is to fail to distinguish the
certainty that an individual can attain in making a decision from absolute certainty. Id. at 77.
lf, on the other hand, the unpopular view is incorrect, Mill argues that it should be
heard nonetheless. Id, at 96-97. If the truth is never contested, people will soon merely
memorize the right answer with no knowledge of its foundations. In these circumstances,
Mill claims that eventually there will be no point in knowing the truth because it will have
no rationally understood underpinnings. Id. at 116.
Furthermore, on many questions, including questions of morals, there are usually only
degrees of truth, and the whole truth may best emerge from a combination of the popular
and the unpopular opinions. Id. at 108. Mill argues that these truths emerge only when all
opinions that contain any truth are discussed. Id. at 116
261 Id. at 119. Mill also points out that speech and opinion are not to be used to incite a
mob to riot or otherwise initiate violence. Id.
262 Id. at 173. Douglas Husak points out that drug addiction is often described as a type
of slavery. Husak, supra note 50, at 375-76 (1989). lie considers whether a definition of
addiction involving physical dependence and painful withdrawal can be equated with the
nonvoluntary nature of slavery. See id. at '375-76. Initially, he states that an attempt to justify
prohibitions on drug use by using the slavery analogy requires that all drugs be categorized
as addictive or nonaddictive; this would mean that a legal drug like caffeine would be
addictive but LSD would not. See id. at 376. Husak then attacks the alleged similarity between
physical dependence and slavery. See id. at 376. He distinguishes physical dependency from
nonvoluntariness by pointing out that although nonvoluntariness is an affirmative defense
in criminal law, drug addiction is not allowed as a defense to criminal liability. Husak admits
that the criminal law definition of nonvoluntariness may vary, with good reason, from the
voluntariness definition for addiction purposes. He argues, however, that the criminal law's
exclusion of addiction as a defense weakens the argument that drug addiction makes drug
use nonvoluntary and that drug use can therefore be prohibited. Id.
Moreover, Husak offers several reasons why prohibiting the use of addictive drugs is
more suspect than outlawing contracts to sell oneself into slavery. Id. at 377. Unlike a slavery
contract, addiction, he points out, does not arise immediately, not all users of addictive drugs
become addicts, and addiction is not or need not be permanent. Id. at 378.
263 J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 173.
264 Id. at 119
-20.
265
 Id. at 120.
266 Id.
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thoughts and actions are admirable, such thoughts nonetheless en-
counter opposition. 267
Aside from allowing individuality to flourish for the sake of
greater knowledge and understanding, 268 Mill states that originality
should be allowed because it is an essential feature of what makes
people different from each other. 269
 Mill claims that people have
different tastes and requirements for spiritual and emotional de-
velopment that produce preferences for different moral climates. 2"
Mill argues that only by allowing diverse actions can all people attain
happiness and the mental, moral, and aesthetic heights of which
they are capable. 27 '
Elsewhere, Mill notes that the distinction that his harm princi-
ple makes between purely private acts and public acts is not appar-
ent to some people. 272 Mill says that the objection to this distinction
is based on the belief that no person is completely isolated from
other people. 273
 Mill admits that many actions that appear to affect
only the actor actually have significant impact on other parties. 274
Mill points out, for example, that some people argue that even
when a landowner commits the seemingly private act of damaging
his own land, he also commits a public act by damaging those whom
he employs on the land. 279
Accordingly, he states that moral disapproval and perhaps legal
intervention are appropriate whenever an individual breaches a
concrete and "assignable" duty to another person. 276 Mill uses as an
example the man who causes grief to his family because of his
addiction to bad habits. 277 Put another way, he says that action that
causes definite damage or a "definite risk of damage" to another
267 Id. at 130.
265 Id.at 129.
265 Id. at 133.
27G Id.
27L Id.
272 Id. at 146.
2" Id.
274 Id. at 148.
275 Id. at 147.
276 Id. at 148.
277 See id. at 148. Mill states that these types of people deserve moral disapprobation for
their breach of duty to their family. Id. Mill argues that the person is no more morally
reprehensible for being addicted to bad habits than he or she would be for having habits
less vicious. Id. The moral blame attaches to the person for breach of duty and does not,
Mill claims, emanate from the cause of the breach or the circumstances that caused the
breach. Id. at 149.
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individual or society in general deserves moral and legal re-
proach. 278
According to Mill, however, conduct that causes only "contin-
gent" or "constructive" damage to society without breaching any
particular duty to the public, and that fails to cause noticeable
damage to any particular individual cannot be controlled by soci-
ety.27" Mill says that society should bear this slight burden because
it is outweighed by the greater human freedom that results. 28" Mill
supports this conclusion by reasoning that the public is more likely
than not to impose an incorrect opinion on the person who engages
in only self-regarding conduct. 28 '
Mill concludes On Liberty by discussing concrete situations that
demonstrate how the harm principle works. For example, he argues
that prohibiting the importation of opium into China is an unjus-
tified restraint on the liberty of the potential buyer. 282 Similarly,
public drunkeness should ordinarily be excluded from legal re-
straint. 283 Mill concedes, however, that the criminal law can prohibit
drinking by anyone who has been known to commit prior violence
even once while drunk and to impart a severe penalty for anyone
who commits subsequent violence while drunk. 284 Mill also notes
that certain acts that are acceptable in private become objectionable
272
	 at 149. At this point in his argument, Mill distinguishes the drunk individual who
should not be punished from the police officer who is drunk on the job who should be
punished. The breach of the duty is the determinative factor. See id.
2" Id. Hart interprets "constructive" to mean that the offense is neither serious nor
likely. H.L.A. HART, supra note 157 at 42-43.
28" J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 149.
RH Id. at 151.
222
 Id. at 165.
222 Id. at 167. Mill also discusses the proper role of the police in controlling trade of
certain items such as poison that can lead to crime or accidents. See id. at 165. He states that
when the police see an individual preparing to commit a crime, intervention is appropriate.
Id. If people purchase poisons solely to commit murder, complete prohibition of the sale and
use of poison is appropriate. Id. But because, he concludes, poison has innocent as well as
useful purposes, prohibition to prevent murder would also prevent the legitimate use of
poison. Id.
2" Id. Mill also discusses whether society is justified in placing limits on the number of
places where alcohol can be obtained, in taxing alcohol at high rates that exclude certain
classes of people from being able to procure it legally, and in licensing places that serve
alcohol. Id. at 170-71. He finds a tax to discourage alcohol consumption unjustified but a
tax to increase state revenue acceptable and often necessary. Id. He notes that laws concerning
hours of operation are appropriate because public places that serve alcohol require state
provided police protection. Likewise, licensing laws are wise because trustworthy bar owners
help minimize public disputes. Id. at 171.
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if performed in public. 285
 These acts, which Mill describes as offen-
ses against decency, can be made illegal if performed in public. 286
Many commentators have criticized Mill's harm principle and
its ramifications. 287
 H.L.A. Hart defended Mill's On Liberty, but not
without qualification. 288 Hart criticizes Mill's harm principle because
it unjustifiably narrowed the guidelines upon which law should be
based by postulating that harm to others is the only sufficient jus-
tification for legal involvement. 289 In particular, Hart disagrees with
Mill's idea that legislators cannot enact laws against drug use for
paternalistic reasons. 29°
He finds Mill's description of free will outdated, pointing out
that individuals do not always or usually know what is in their best
interest. 29 ' According to Hart, paternalistic drug laws aimed at pro-
tecting individuals from themselves are justified because humans
are not as free to choose their actions as they would like to believe. 292
He states that human choices may be made without adequate re-
flection on consequences, when judgment is clouded, or when oth-
ers exert subtle pressure, such as peer pressure. 295 All of these
possibilities affect the free decision-making process. 294 Finally, Hart
objects to Mill's opposition to paternalism because it is incorrectly
based on the idea that all people have fixed desires and complete
knowledge of how to satisfy them. 295
Douglas Husak disagrees with Hart and concludes that a pa-
ternalistic justification for drug laws is problematic and depends on
unanswered empirical questions. 296 Husak introduces the topic of
paternalistic drug laws by suggesting that society is willing to debate
the efficacy of mandatory seat belt and motorcycle helmet laws but
285
	 at 168.
265
	 Mill does not list which acts he has in mind.
267 See infra notes 288-95,319-26.
tea
	 H.L.A. HART, supra note 157, at 5.
289
	 id. at 32.
29° See id. at 32-33. Mill mentions only opium and alcohol. J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at
165,167.
291 See H.L,A. HART, supra note 157 at 32-33.
292 See id,
293
 Id. at 33.
294 Id. Another philosopher makes a similar point in his analysis of Mill's reason for
exempting children from the limits placed on society by the harm principle. S. LEE, LAW AND
MORALS 24 (1986). Mill does so, he says, because children do not fully realize the consequences
of their actions. Lee asks, who does? Id.
2" H.L.A. HART, supra note 157, at 33. Hart claims that Mill's idea of the typical human
being more closely resembles the psychology of a middle-aged man. Id.
216 Husak, supra note 50, at 353-54.
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refuses to analyze paternalistic drug laws with equal vigor. 297
 Husak
attacks drug paternalism using the deontological moral theory based
on the principle of human autonomy. 298
Husak begins his discussion of the deontological argument
against paternalistic drug laws by stating the principle of autonomy:
autonomy encompasses the right to make choices and decisions, and
foremost among these choices is the decision whether to put a
substance in one's body. 299 Husak asks whether the autonomy prin-
ciple can be framed so that harmful decisions such as the right to
eat fried foods are protected but the decision to use illicit drugs is
not protected. 30° Husak suggests that the degree of harm that results
from the action may provide a discriminatory mechanism. 3" Husak
doubts, however, whether such a principle can explain the status of
all drugs today, asks how the degree of harm should be calculated,
and denies that any standard of harm could be created that would
properly compare the risks of drug use, fried foods, driving without
seat belts, and so forth. 902
Notwithstanding this rejection of the "degree of harm" prin-
ciple as a paternalistic guide, Husak acknowledges that some pater-
nalistic laws are acceptable despite the principle of autonomy. 303
Specifically, Husak first describes soft paternalism, which permits
the state to "prevent self-regarding harmful conduct when but only
when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary." 3 U 4 To explicate
the concept of voluntariness, Husak describes one philosopher's
definition as a "variable concept," replete with cut off points deter-
mined by the circumstances, the interests at stake, and the purpose
of the law. 3 D3
Husak reviews three situations involving drug use to distinguish
voluntary from nonvoluntary conduct. In scenario one, A wrongly
297
 Id. at 354.
3" Id. at 363; see supra text accompanying notes 241-54 for Richards's discussion of
paternalism.
Husak lists several initial problems with any paternalistic argument in favor of drug
criminalization. See id. at 357. These include: l) the distinction to be made between acceptable
and unacceptable paternalism; 2) the difficulty in separating "harm to others" justifications
from paternalistic reasons for drug laws; and 3) the need to discount the illegal nature of
drugs when calculating whether paternalistic drug laws are warranted. Id. at 357-60.
299
 Id. at 367.
3" Id. at 366-67.
331 Id. at 367-68.
sup
	 at 360.
" Id. at 357.
504 Id. at 370.
305 Id. at 370-71.
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believes that drug Z does not cause physical harm; in scenario two,
A knows that Z is harmful but A uses the drug because he wants to
harm himself; and in the last scenario, A knows that Z may harm
him, and does not want to be harmed, but takes Z because he thinks
the pleasure it will bring is worth the risk of harm.'" Typical drug
use, Husak notes, is most similar to scenario three, and is definitely
a voluntary acts° As such, Husak finds little reason to support
paternalistic drug laws on the assumption that drug use is nonvo-
luntary. 308
Husak also discusses hard paternalism, which allows paternal-
istic laws in situations other than where nonvoluntary conduct is
found.309 Other theorists embracing this type of paternalism ac-
knowledge that people's short-term actions do not always further
their long-term goals, and may be the result of "carelessness, un-
reflectiveness, short-sightedness, or foolishness." 31 ° Husak expresses
an attraction to hard paternalism because he finds certain circum-
stances in which a person's short-term acts clearly clash with that
person's long-term priorities. 3 " In these instances, he says, pater-
nalistic laws actually help individuals attain their own ends. 312
Ultimately, however, Husak thinks hard paternalism cannot
justify drug laws. 3 ' 3 First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate
a person's permanent long-term goals from other goals. 314 More-
over, no general law could account for different people's long-term
goals and the extent to which drug use hinders realization of those
goals.315 Finally, paternalistically driven drug laws will prevent drug
use not only by those individuals whose long-term goals would be
frustrated, but also by those whose permanent interests are not
affected by drug use."' A deontological theory of paternalism,
based on individual autonomy, Husak concludes, should not permit
drug laws based on the gains seen by some, where the autonomy of
366 Id.
5" Id, at 371-72. Husak admits that this illustration of voluntariness is unhelpful to
legislators who do not have the luxury of personally interviewing constituents before passing
paternalistic legislation.
348 Id. at 373.
3"6 Id. at 379.
31 ° Id.
3 " Id. at 379-80.
3 " Id, at 380.
3 " Id. at 381.
3" Id. at 379.
' 15 Id. at 380.
' 16 Id.
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others is diminished. 317 Husak decides that there are currently no
valid paternalistic justifications for drug laws."'
Richards also criticizes Mill's theory. He observes that the harm
principle does not describe the American system of law and morality
and that the principle enunciated in On Liberty cannot help law-
makers make proper decisions concerning how to enact law."' In
addition, he questions whether the harm principle supports Mill's
search for maximizing utility. 320
Richards's first objection is based on the deontological theory
of morals. He points out that the United States Constitution is based
on a theory of human rights, especially the right to privacy. 321
Richards states that Mill's harm principle and his theory of utility
are not based on rights of any kind. 322 As a result, Richards argues
that Mill's theory offers no relevant guidance to United States law-
makers and cannot adequately challenge the arguments made by
those who favor drug criminalization.323
Richards's second objection is that Mill's harm principle, which
allows governmental interference with individual actions only when
these actions harm others, does not lead inexorably to the maxim-
ization of societal utility over time. 324 Richards envisions a large
majority of the members of a hypothetical society who enjoy knowing
that the law forbids the minority citizens from practicing their
deeply felt beliefs. 325 Richards argues that Mill's overarching goal
of maximizing utility requires that the criminal law enforce the
5 ' 2 Id. at 381.
5L5 Id,
519 See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
52" See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
521 Richards, supra note 83, at 616. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (the right
to privacy allows a woman and her physician to have complete discretion to effectuate an
abortion up to approximately the end or the first trimester); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
478, 485 (1965) (the right to privacy allows use of contraception in the home).
s" Richards, supra note 83, at 611.
525 Id. at 613. Lord Devlin makes a related point about the efficacy of Mill's harm
principle. P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 104-05. Devlin claims that Mill's doctrine has been
around for a long time without ever having been put into practice. Id, at 125. He says that
he does not believe that the law will ever correspond with Mill's doctrine. See id. In short,
Devlin states that the debate over the efficacy of the harm principle has nothing to do with
contemporary social reality.
Devlin says that the problem with the harm principle is that it assumes, unrealistically,
that the minority will pose no trouble for the majority. See id. at 105. If 90 citizens think
employment is good whereas 10 find idleness to be good, the 90 suffer at the expense of the
10. Id. at 106.
524 Richards, supra note 83, at 615.
545 Id.
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majority will against the minority. In other words, Richards argues
that satisfying utility may conflict with the dictates of the harm
principle. 32°
In summary, three distinct ethical theories have been discussed
that propose to explain when society may intervene in the individ-
ual's state of affairs. According to Devlin, society has a right to
enforce its moral views against nonconforming individuals when-
ever society fears that the continuation of this particular type of
private immorality threatens, or is capable of threatening, its exis-
tence. 327 According to Rawls, human autonomy ensures that people
have a minimum number of rights. In applying Rawls's theory,
Richards argues that human beings' intrinsic rights dictate that
rational drug use that does not interfere with the autonomy of
others must be permitted. 32° Finally, Mill states that the harm prin-
ciple requires that mature individuals be permitted to use certain
drugs as long as they do not inflict harm on others in doing so. 329
III. PRACTICAL AND MORAL BENEFITS OF DRUG LEGALIZATION
The United States' goal to eliminate illegal drug use by 1995
through the imposition of criminal sanctions is illusory. 33° The com-
bination of the inelasticity of demand for cocaine, crack, and heroin,
and inadequate anti-drug funding make effective prohibition of
drugs impossible without turning the United States into a police
state."' Advocates of continued criminalization point to the declin-
ing use of illicit substances as proof that the stringent drug laws are
working effectively. 332 In light of declining use of alcohol and to-
bacco,"3 however, health concerns and increased education and
awareness about the potential dangers of drugs also clearly account
for the decline in the use of marijuana and cocaine." 4 Furthermore,
although casual drug use is down, high volume and addictive use
326 Id,
327 See supra notes 136-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of legal moralism.
328 See supra notes 215-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Richards's deon-
tological theory.
32" See supra notes 256-326 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mill's harm
principle.
33° See 1988 Act, supra note 2, at 4310.
"' See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of inelasticity; see infra
note 371 for a discussion of methods that might enhance enforcement.
332 See Church, supra note 42, at 18.
Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 26.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
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is not."' Because this latter type of use causes most drug-related
crime, violence, and death, one cannot rightfully conclude that
criminal sanctions are working effectively.
Arguments against legalization of drugs are two-fold. First, the
United States resists legalization because it fears increased violence,
crime and death."6 Second, this society believes drug use is im-
moral."' Both premises are mistaken.
A. Fallacies of Practical justifications for Drug Criminalization
The first of the practical reasons for criminalizing drugs is that
a connection supposedly exists between drug use and crime. 338 In
actuality, drug legalization will reduce two types of drug-related
crime—systemic and economic compulsive—but the third type-
psychopharmacological—may be a legitimate bar to legalization. In
contrast, drug criminalization causes systemic, and to a large extent,
economic compulsive crime. 339
To the extent that drug legalization eradicates the black market,
systemic crime and homicide will significantly diminish if not dis-
appear. Although economic compulsive crime will not disappear if
heroin, marijuana, and cocaine are legalized, by definition such
crime will diminish greatly. Heroin addicts, for instance, commit
many nonviolent property crimes,340 including theft, to meet the
high prices that the black market demands, but not because of the
effects of heroin. By artificially raising the price of drugs, the drug
laws themselves cause a large proportion of the property theft in the
United States."' Because legalization of heroin and cocaine would
reduce their price, addicts would have less need to steal to afford
these drugs. Although some addicts who temper their use because
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 11 13,
"'" See supra notes 16-125 and accompanying text.
3" See supra note 47.
33 3 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
333 In the DRCA-H2 homicide study, systemic violence, exclusively related to the realities
of doing business in an illegal market, accounted for 40% of the homicides in New York City
in 1988, and a full 75% of the drug-related homicides. See DRCA-H2,supra note 62, at 20.
Crack and cocaine were the primary drugs involved in almost 90% of these drug-related
homicides. Id. at 19-20. By comparison, use of alcohol led to many drug-related deaths, but
none were described as systemic. Id. When a drug is legal, no disputes arise over price, or
who has a right to sell the drug in which areas, nor are there dealers who kill their couriers
when they suspect these couriers are skimming profits off the top.
540 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
3 I See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of drug law-related
deaths.
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of exorbitant black market prices will purchase larger quantities of
heroin and cocaine in a legal market, 842 theft for drug purchases
will decrease. 343
Given the close connection between systemic and economic
compulsive crime and the current drug laws, legalization advocates
need only confront psychopharmacologically induced crime. Be-
cause the psychopharmacological properties of each drug are
unique, we can distinguish those drugs that should be legalized
from those that should remain illegal. For example, existing liter-
ature, though scant, suggests that users high on crack and those
"coming down" from its effects may act violently. 344
In contrast, current data on the causal nexus between cocaine
use and psychopharmacological violence, though also surprisingly
sparse, indicates that cocaine users are less likely to be induced to
violence than crack users. 345
 Furthermore, a large amount of co-
caine-related psychopharmacological violence occurs when users are
"coming down," not when they are high on the drug itself. 34° Co-
caine's moderate tendency to cause this type of violence is an in-
sufficient reason to criminalize its use and sale. If further research
uncovers a closer association between cocaine use and psychophar-
macological violence, legislators should review the merits of legal-
izing cocaine.
The threat of psychopharmacological violence fails to explain
to any degree, however, why heroin and marijuana are illegal and
alcohol is legal. Neither heroin nor marijuana use leads users to
behave violently. 347 Heroin addicts in withdrawal account for the
small amount of reported heroin-related psychopharmacological
violence. 348
 On the other hand, alcohol use is strongly linked with
5" See M. MOORE, supra note 31, at 8-9 for a discussion of heroin addicts' ability to
reduce use.
545 Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 11. Heroin and cocaine sell on the black market for as
much as 100 times what they cost to manufacture. In a legal market that allows for substantial
taxes, heroin and cocaine could sell for one-fifth as much as they cost on the black market
and still be cheap enough to deter users from continuing to make black market purchases.
Based on this figure, users would have to increase consumption fivefold before economic
compulsive thefts for legal drug purchases would be as frequent as thefts to finance black
market drugs.
5" See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text
x43
	 supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
"ft See DRIVE, supra note 56, at 13.
" 7 See L. GRINSPOON & P. HEDBLOM, supra note 66, at 184 (heroin); see supra note 61
(marijuana).
5" See RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT UNIT, supra note 67, at 14; DRIVE, supra note 56, at
13.
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psychopharmacological violence."" In fact, alcohol is more closely
linked with violence than crack.
Thus, psychopharmacological violence alone cannot justify the
criminalization of heroin and marijuana. Moreover, one must doubt
whether it explains the illegality of crack and cocaine. Despite its
high association with violence, alcohol remains legal for other rea-
sons. The comparison between the psychopharmacological tenden-
cies of alcohol and illegal drugs compels one to look elsewhere to
explain why advocates of continued criminalization consider legal-
ization of the illegal drugs inappropriate.
The second justification for the criminalization of drugs is that
legalization will precipitate an increase in drug-related deaths. By
one estimate, however, a very large percentage of the 3,500 annual
deaths that are labeled drug overdoses are actually the result of
such factors as dirty needles and accidental overdoses due to un-
known purity levels of drugs."'" These causes of death could be
reduced, or even eliminated, by selling clean needles at low cost,
labeling purity levels, listing ingredients, and providing other safety
measures, all of which could be implemented through drug legali-
zation."' Apart from the fact that drug legalization, coupled with
appropriate precautionary measures, could reduce drug-related
deaths, the argument that criminalization is justified by concern
about drug-related deaths seems disingenuous in light of the ap-
proximate 500,000 Americans who die each year because of legal
alcohol and cigarette use."'
In sum, the drug laws have not deterred heavy and addicted
users from using drugs. Consequently, drug-related economic com-
pulsive and systemic crime remain largely unaffected by the current
drug laws. In contrast, legalization will reduce these two types of
crime dramatically by reducing both the black market and addicts'
need to steal for drugs. Justifying criminalization by pointing to
drug-related deaths is unpersuasive because many of these deaths
are caused by black market factors that legalization would largely
eradicate.
3" See E. Gomm:, supra note 1, at 118; S. KADIS11, S. ScituLtroyEtt, & M. PAULSEN, supra
note 111, at 753.
'5° See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 14.
951 See id. at 46.
331 See Raspberry, Legalizing Drugs: Let's Gel Specific, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1989, at A25,
col. 1.
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B. Moral Justifications for Drug Legalization
The moral theories discussed in this note demonstrate that it
is difficult to create a coherent moral theory that supports crimin-
alization of drugs. Richards's deontological theory and Mill's harm
principle favor legalization of at least some drugs. Of the three
primary theories discussed, only Devlin's public harm theory favors
continued criminalization, although paternalism also attempts to
justify criminalization.
Devlin's public harm theory, which advocates the use of the
criminal law to prohibit private immorality that society deems in-
jurious, supports criminal sanctions against illegal drug use. Devlin's
theory supports these sanctions because United States society re-
gards drug use as the most pressing problem facing this country
today."' Presumably, this concern means that the public considers
private drug use to be intolerable. As long as private drug use
provokes "intolerance, indignation, and disgust"'" in the public at
large, Devlin would say that the public ought to be able to prohibit
the sale and private use of drugs.
Devlin's argument, however, is seriously deficient. First, the
state, in enacting legislation against intolerable private acts of im-
morality, cannot determine clearly the public will. Devlin's adoption
of the right-minded person or jury may explain how a jury will
decide whether a particular individual has violated a law designed
to enforce the public moral code, but does not explain how Congress
originally ascertained the public will.'"
Second, Hart's criticism of Devlin's "leap in logic" is accurate.
Devlin misses a step when he shifts from the idea that the public
sometimes feels intolerant towards an individual's private immor-
ality to the idea that, if left unchecked, this intolerance may lead to
the collapse of society. 356 According to Devlin, feelings of "intoler-
ance, indignation, and disgust" justify the legal enforcement of
public morality because these feelings signify that society fears it is
on the brink of collapse."' It remains unclear why such feelings are
indicative of a rational fear of society's collapse. Society may fear
"' See LEGALIZATION: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, supra note 1, at 3 (recent opinion poll
cited).
3" See supra note 157 for a discussion of this language.
3" See supra note 147 for a discussion of the right-minded person.
356 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
337 See P. DEVLIN, supra note 128, at 17.
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its own collapse is imminent, but, if this fear is unfounded, no good
reason exists for enforcing morality through the criminal law.'"
Despite its limitations, Rawls's deontological theory is generally
more defensible than Devlin's public harm theory. Rawls states that
if individuals are to attain their full humanity, they must be allowed
to act autonomously, provided they do not interfere with the au-
tonomy of others.369 Because David Richards's drug legalization
argument relies on deontological moral theorists such as Rawls,
criticisms of Rawls's theory are applicable to Richards's theory as
well.
Alan Gewirth, another deontological moral philosopher, criti-
cizes Rawls's use of the "veil of ignorance" in the "original position"
because it is nonrational. 36° Rawls replies that the "veil of igno-
rance," which prevents those people voting on the rules of justice
from knowing the particulars of their wealth, status and intelligence,
is rational because it is designed to produce just principles.'" Rawls
explains that if individuals' knowledge of their status enters into
the process of selecting rules of justice, these rules will not treat all
persons as moral equals. As such, Rawls seems to devise the "veil of
ignorance" to provide a theory that confirms how our moral senti-
ments about rights and obligations can be verified.
Gewirth acknowledges that the imposition of the "veil of ig-
norance" facilitates the creation of fair rules of justice. 362
 He is
correct nonetheless to maintain that the "veil of ignorance" is not
rational because people do, in fact, know the particulars of their
status, wealth and power. Because the "veil of ignorance" is irra-
tional, Gewirth properly concludes that it is impossible for Rawls to
justify rationally that real people forget their knowledge when mak-
ing the rules of justice. As such, Rawls's criterion that the "veil of
ignorance" blankets those voting in the "original position" is illogi-
cal.
333 Dworkin's critique of the argument he attributes to Devlin is also correct. Devlin
bases his moral theory on the idea that society's feelings, without a great deal of reason, can
prevent individual action it abhors. Dworkin correctly points out that reason must be involved
before anyone can claim to make a moral judgment. Thus, Devlin's view that society makes
a moral judgment based on feeling, which it is then entitled to act upon, is fallacious.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 186-255 for a discussion of deontological moral
theory.
3" A. GEWIRTH, supra note 255, at 108-09.
35, J. RAWLS, supra note 150, at 141.
"2 A. GEWIRTH, supra note 255, at 108.
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Despite the irrationality of the "veil of ignorance," Rawls's
deontological theory is compelling. It attributes dignity to the hu-
man being by acknowledging that people are autonomous and by
ensuring that they have a base level of rights. If deontological theory
is correct, Richards properly applies that theory to drug legalization
and provides an appropriate resolution of the drug controversy.
Further, for the most part, Richards successfully attacks the moral
arguments against drug legalization.
Richards first addresses the moral argument that drug use is
degrading because it leads to a loss of self-control. Richards cor-
rectly notes that people use illegal drugs for a variety of reasons,
including perhaps to lose control. Moreover, drug use need not lead
to loss of control if users choose to limit their intake. Most impor-
tantly, proponents of the degradation argument fail to realize that
self-control is not the ultimate goal for all drug-users at all times.
Richards is less successful in addressing the argument that use
of addictive drugs is immoral because addiction prevents individuals
from acting in fundamentally human ways. Although deontological
moral theory focuses on individual autonomy, Richards fails to
address adequately the fact that a drug addict has little option to
refrain from drug use. His statements that phenomena besides the
drugs themselves, such as poverty, contribute to drug addiction, do
not rebut the claim that drug addicts lose the ability to determine
whether they wish to take drugs.
Richards's failure, though, is not fatal to his theory. As Douglas
Husak points out, addiction is a gradual process, not all users of
potentially addictive drugs become addicted, and active addiction
need not be permanent. 363 At the very least, deontological theory
protects an individual's decision to try addictive drugs where the
individual may not become addicted. Stretched to its limit, this
theory might justify an addict's continued use of drugs, because
that addict could decide to seek treatment or otherwise curb use. 364
Mill provides yet another moral perspective on the issue of
drug legalization. One can draw an analogy from drug addiction to
Mill's prohibition on selling oneself into slavery363 to mean that he
thinks addictive drugs should be illegal. Yet Mill favored legalization
of alcohol and opium. Perhaps he was not aware that some drinkers
"" Sre Husak, supra note 50, at 377-78.
'" See supra notes 296a-318 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Husak's
response to the paternalistic argument against drug use.
!65
	 J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 173.
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become addicted to alcohol. On the other hand, Douglas Husak's
explanation of the difference between drug addiction and slavery
may explain why Mill favored legalization of alcohol and why the
addictive properties of cocaine and heroin would not cause Mill to
outlaw them.'"
Mill stated that acts that always lead to violence should be out-
lawed, but acts that may be used for good or bad purposes should
be allowed. He used poison as an example of a substance that could
be used for malevolent or beneficial purposes. 367 Similarly, Mill
might not outlaw use of drugs such as cocaine, marijuana or heroin,
despite their potential for inducing violence and crime.
H.L.A. Hart's paternalistically based response to Mill's assertion
that harm to others is the only justification for interference with an
individual's private conduct is compelling at first blush. If Hart is
correct, paternalism may justify laws against drug use, even though
Devlin's theory, which sometimes allows the legal enforcement of
morality per se, does not. Hart stresses that paternalistic drug laws
are justified because private human actions are not as free as Mill
thought they were. Hart maintains that peer pressure and other
psychological dynamics often interfere with the autonomous deci-
sion-making process.
Hart's statements are sound. Still, hard paternalism,'" which
Hart seems to espouse, fails to explain how society is more qualified
to determine the individual's "true" goals than the individual. With-
out proof that society can determine what is actually best for an
individual, paternalistic laws merely replace the individual's desires
with the legislators' wishes.
Husak's criticisms of Hart's theory reinforce the belief that hard
paternalism cannot justify drug criminalization. Husak properly
admits that in certain situations individuals take short-term courses
of action that conflict with their long-term goals. Hard paternalism
attempts to prevent precisely these types of irrational acts. Husak
exposes a flaw in this theory, however, because hard paternalism
can work in specific cases but could not work as a general criminal
law. Drug laws cannot and do not separate incidents of drug use
that are irrational from drug use that is consistent with a person's
366 See supra note 262 for a discussion of Husak's comparison of drug addiction to
slavery.
56' .S. Mu.t, supra note 133, at 165.
sex
	 supra text accompanying notes 304-318 for a comparison of hard and soft
paternalism.
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long-term goals. Thus, although hard paternalism can justify par-
ticular efforts to prevent drug use, it cannot justify nation-wide
drug laws.
Husak also properly disposes of soft paternalism, which pro-
hibits private acts that are deemed nonvoluntary, as a justification
for the drug laws. Husak admits that soft paternalism might be
appropriate but determines that most drug use is voluntary. Husak
is probably right that most drug use is voluntary in that users choose
to use drugs despite awareness of the risks of physical harm and
addiction. Thus, soft paternalism, even if justified, cannot explain .
drug criminalization.
In contrast to Hart's criticisms, Richards's criticisms of Mill are
not problematic. Although Richards's comment that society has
never embraced Mill's harm principle is true, it is irrelevant. That
is, society does not currently use Mill's theory as the model for
criminal legislation. Richards's criticism, however, does not address
whether Mill's theory ought to be used.
There is some support for Richards's second objection to Mill's
harm principle—that it does not guarantee maximum utility for
humankind in the long run. His depiction of a society that enjoys
imposing its views on the minority through law provides a good
example. There is, however, some doubt whether Mill wrote On
Liberty to justify his theory of utility. It seems likely that Mill wrote
On Liberty to champion individual liberty, independent of its rami-
fications on long-term societal utility. 369 Otherwise, as one critic
points out, Mill never would have written the harm principle in
such a way that society is prohibited from interfering with private
individual conduct even when such interference would make the
individual happier. Therefore, it is an open question whether this
objection carries any weight. Assuming that it does have merit, it
does not reach the justifications for legal drug use that the harm
principle creates. At best, it demonstrates an inconsistency between
Mill's belief concerning appropriate moral constraints on the indi-
vidual and his view, expressed elsewhere, on how to attain the most
beneficial society.
In sum, Devlin's public harm theory, which opposes legalization
of drugs, fails for several reasons. Devlin explained that the criminal
law should reinforce public morality only when the public fears that
369 1.1immelfarb, Introduction to J.S. MILL, supra note 133, at 31. Bul see note 258 For
Mill's explanation that utility, based on the permanent interests of man, is the goal of the
harm principle.
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a particular immoral act has placed society on the verge of collapse.
He fails to explain how lawmakers are to know when this fear exists.
Another flaw in the public harm theory is that it does not require
that society's fear of collapse be rational before the criminal law will
be invoked on its behalf. History is replete with examples of irra-
tional societal hysteria. Devlin's theory should require some proof
of imminent collapse before the criminal law enforces public mo-
rality.
Richards's application of deontological moral theory to drug
legalization is compelling and innovative. What is lacking is a specific
plan for implementing legalization and a list of the drugs to legalize.
Although his work suffers from the general deficiencies of deon-
tological moral theory, it adequately handles many of the common
arguments made against drug use including loss of control, addic-
tion and paternalism. Where Richards's arguments are deficient,
Husak's deontological arguments fill in the gaps. in particular, Hu-
sak skillfully handles the addiction argument and the argument that
concerns for the drug users themselves justify drug criminalization.
Mill's harm principle is also compelling. Mill's principle is con-
crete enough to suggest that legalization of marijuana, heroin and
cocaine are appropriate because harm to others appears to be less
likely with these drugs than with alcohol, which Mill specifically
sanctioned. 37° Richards's assertion that the harm principle clashes
with Mill's utilitarian moral theory is intriguing but, even if true,
does not weaken the harm principle. This claim merely points out
that the two theories may be inconsistent.
C. Legislative Framework for Drug Legalization
Legalization of marijuana, heroin and perhaps cocaine seems
preferable to criminalization for both practical and moral reasons.
To this end, Congress should develop a workable legalization frame-
work."' Such a framework must be morally acceptable and must
"" Until researchers provide. further scientific evidence, it is unclear whether adoption
of the harm principle would require legalization of other drugs, such as crack, that might
create a great probability of harm to others.
" 1 It is true that with unlimited funds, the United States could greatly reduce the
current level of drug use and abuse. It is unlikely, however, that the requisite amount of
funding is politically possible, and if it were, the United States would eventually resemble a
totalitarian state reminiscent of George Orwell's 1984. It is difficult to determine how much
more than the current $10 billion spent annually is needed to make serious additional inroads
in the prevalence of drug use. Although fewer people are using drugs now than in the 1980s,
the number of cocaine addicts and crack addicts seems to be stable or increasing slightly.
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incorporate provisions to reduce drug-related crime, violence, death
and addiction, and limit or prevent an increase in use. What follows
is a proposal that attempts to meet these criteria:
1) Use of all drugs, including cigarettes and alcohol, except
prescription drugs, is illegal for anyone under twenty-one years of
age.372
2) Use of legal drugs will not be permitted in public, although
an individual may be under the influence of legal drugs in public." 3
Assuming that as little as an additional $10 billion would greatly curtail drug use, where is
the source for this extra money? The balanced budget amendment reduced additional federal
drug allocations from over $2.5 billion to $500 million in 1989. The current United States
political climate makes it unlikely that additional funds will come from taxes or by borrowing
from other planned governmental outlays. Furthermore, it may take more than $10 billion
to achieve significant change in heavy drug consumption.
Despite this economic reality, the predominant reason for eschewing such a plan is that
it will wreak havoc on individual freedom in the United States. Consider that the most
effective suggestions for using increased funding to decrease drug use include urine testing
and/or blood testing of all citizens or perhaps just arrestees, and using beepers and other
sophisticated devices designed to monitor unwanted actions. These intrusive devices run
counter to the moral, historical, social, and perhaps constitutional fabric of the United States.
Although it is debatable whether the Supreme Court has already gone too far to accommodate
drug legislation, it seems clear that more extensive enforcement will lead our country down
an undesirable path. The amount of public funding needed for truly effective enforcement
does not now exist and is not likely to exist in the near future. More importantly, this
enforcement would be improper, if not inhumane.
A second possibility, espoused by James Hall, is to maintain the status quo law enforce-
ment efforts and to augment the use of treatment, education, family, religious and work-
related efforts to eliminate drug abuse. Hall, Victory in the War on Drugs, STREET PHARMACOL-
OGIST NEWSLETTER, May/June 1988, at 1. See supra note 125 for a discussion of Hall's view.
Hall is correct to emphasize non-force-related attempts to reduce the demand for, and
consequently, the use of drugs. Hall's solution sidesteps the evils of heightened governmental
intervention into people's lives and has the benefit of treating drug abuse as a health problem,
which should encourage addicts to seek treatment. Like the increased funding solution,
however, additional treatment, education, and other nonenforcement solutions require
money that does not exist. Furthermore, under this strategy, the 10% of the drug-using
population that is caught by enforcement techniques continues to suffer for doing what,
under discrete circumstances, it should be allowed to do.
372 The age of twenty-one is arbitrary. Any sufficiently high age is acceptable. This
section is based on Mill's and Richards's moral theories, both of which acknowledge that only
mature individuals, who are likely to understand fully the risks of using drugs, should be
free to risk harm to themselves and to make autonomous decisions of this type. See supra
text accompanying notes 353-70 for an analysis of the moral theories.
873
	 example, even those twenty-one or older will be prohibited from smoking
marijuana in public although they may smoke at home and then go out in public. The
purpose of this section is to counter the claim that legalization, despite education and
advertising about the harms of drug use, will suggest that the United States promotes or
condones drug use. Although children will inevitably come into contact with adults under
the influence of legal drugs, such as marijuana, they will not be forced to encounter drug
use itself. Alcohol would be the exception because the United States is not likely to tolerate
a law that prohibits consumption of alcohol at bars and restaurants.
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3) Government-funded testing will determine whether anyone
under the influence of any particular legal drug will be permitted
to drive a motor vehicle or perform other similar mechanical activ-
ities that might be dangerous to pursue while under the influence.
Some drugs might be legal for some purposes, e.g., smoking a
cigarette while driving a car, but not for others.
4) Legal drugs will be taxed, but prices will remain substantially
below prior black market prices." 4 Otherwise, if legal prices ap-
proach black market prices, users may be tempted to use the black
market to remain anonymous.
5) Taxes generated from drug sales will be used for extensive
education programs, including advertising, that objectively explain
the definite and potential dangers of drug use, and the more severe
consequences of using black market drugs."' These taxes will also
subsidize treatment facilities for drug addicts.
6) The primary criteria for determining which drugs
will be legal include risk of addiction and incidence of
psychopharmacological violence." 6 In the end, Congress will
"4 By one estimate, black market heroin and cocaine sell for about 100 times more than
they cost to make. See Ostrowski, supra note 16, at 1 1 .
"5 Awareness of the risk of addiction, physical harm and death from drug use is the
best way to reduce drug use. Crack has been less problematic in Hawaii than elsewhere in
the United States in part, at least, because all Hawaiians had been hearing about the dangers
of crack for about two years before it was available in Hawaii. See Select Comm. on Narcotics
Abuse and Control: Hearing on the Reemergence of Metharaphetamine, (1989) (statement of Daniel
Akaka) (explaining that education of the harms of crack reduced crack consumption in
Hawaii). Young people on the mainland have also shown that their drug consumption is
shaped a good deal by their perception of the degree of harm tied to drug use. DRUG USE,
DRINKING, AND SMOKING, supra note 13, at 5-6.
"6 These two factors are derived from the ethical theories of Mill and Richards. Mill
opposed human actions that led to a subsequent loss of choice such as selling oneself into
slavery and allowed prohibition of action that was likely to lead to harm to another. Richards's
argument in favor of legalization is that the potential user should have the autonomy to
make that decision. If use of a drug leads to physical dependence such that the user can no
longer voluntarily decide not to use the drug, there is good reason to prohibit use of that
drug.
At present, addiction to cigarettes is viewed differently than addiction to heroin or
cocaine largely because cigarettes are legal but heroin and cocaine are not. Cigarettes are as,
or more, addictive than heroin, cocaine, or even crack. See Husak, supra note 50, at 377-78,
n.60. Heroin addicts may experience withdrawal, whereas cigarette addicts may become edgy,
tense, and nervous between cigarettes. Nonsmokers increasingly regard smokers with dis-
approval but few think that the cigarette addict is dangerous or mentally sick. If heroin and
cocaine are made legal. addictions to these drugs will eventually provoke similar sentiment—
strong disapproval but no fear or loathing.
Thus, the degree to which a drug causes psychopharmacological violence, namely vio-
lence resulting purely from use of a drug, provides a better justification for criminalizing
that drug than its rate of addiction. Richards supports laws against use of drugs that leads
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need to determine the appropriate parameters for these
criteria. 877
Using the guidelines identified in section 6 of this note's legal-
ization proposal, the determination of which drugs should be le-
galized is as follows. Alcohol will remain legal despite its significant
correlation with psychopharmacological violence and its highly ad-
dictive nature because Prohibition was unsuccessful and drinking is
widely accepted in our culture. Alcohol, however, should not be the
measure of the legality of other drugs that are less prevalent in
society.
Marijuana is not commonly considered addictive; the propor-
tion of heavy users to casual users is low. 378
 Moreover, marijuana's
tendency to create psychopharmacological violence is slight. 379 As a
result, marijuana should definitely be legalized.
Although a sizeable but unknown proportion of heroin users
become addicts, heroin should be legalized because there is a slight
or nonexistent correlation between heroin use and psychopharma-
cological violence. 380 If a twenty-one year old willingly chooses to
purchase heroin, knowing the risk of addiction, that person should
be allowed to do so. The risk of addiction after one or even a few
uses is not as great as people commonly think."' Furthermore,
improved drug education will make it unlikely that heroin use will
increase after legalization.
Cocaine presents a unique problem. If crack did not exist,
cocaine should probably be legalized because current evidence sug-
gests that use of powder cocaine is neither so addictive nor so likely
to lead to psychopharmacological violence to justify its criminaliza-
don. The problem is that powder cocaine is easily converted into
crack cocaine, and presently, crack is associated with a higher rate
to violence, because use of such drugs interferes with another's autonomy. Both Mill and
Richards acknowledge that a substance should be outlawed if it can be shown that the
substance leads to harm to others.
"7
 Certain parameters, however, can be sketched out. For example, if drug X causes
addiction in 90% of those who try it and causes 80% of its users to become violent, drug X
would be outlawed for all age groups. Legislators, however, should bear in mind Richards's
presumption that human decisions to use a particular drug are rational and that almost all
legal activities such as driving a car have at least some propensity for causing harm to another.
Legislators should also consider the high rates of addiction and psychopharmacological
violence associated with alcohol and the high rate of addiction associated with cigarette use.
878 See Wallenstein, supra note 104, at 62.
"' See supra note 61.
888 See DRIVE, supra note 56, at 13.
881 See ,J. KAPLAN, supra note 99, at 33; M. MOORE, supra note 101, at 9.
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of addiction than cocaine, and is more likely to lead to psychophar-
macological violence than cocaine.
Although some studies have been conducted to determine
crack's precise rate of addiction and tendency to cause violence, 382
there is insufficient evidence thus far to establish firmly these cor-
relations. After careful evaluation, the United States may decide
that the connection between crack and addiction and violence has
been exaggerated and that crack should be legalized. It is quite
likely, however, that this connection will be great enough to justify
the criminalization of crack.
Thus, the dilemma is whether to legalize powder cocaine but
criminalize crack, knowing that crack users and addicts will buy
legal cocaine and convert it to crack, or to criminalize all types of
cocaine to prevent such conversion. If both powder cocaine and
crack remain criminalized, the large black market for these two
drugs, which accounts for much of the drug-related systemic and
economic compulsive crime and violence in the United States, 383
will remain intact. Furthermore, criminalization of both drugs will
punish powder cocaine users who would otherwise be permitted to
use cocaine under the proposed legalization scheme.
Assuming the legalization of cocaine but not crack, one way to
limit the conversion of legally purchased cocaine into illegal crack
is to limit the daily amount of powder cocaine that each person can
purchase. This procedure would prevent cocaine purchasers from
having a crack black market because they would have little cocaine
to convert into crack for illegal use or sale. Thus, powder cocaine
would be legal but it would be illegal to convert powder cocaine
into crack cocaine.
There are obvious drawbacks to this option. First, the illegality
of converting cocaine into crack will do little to stop crack users
from ritually performing this conversion. Further, individuals will
have different consumption desires and needs and it will be difficult
to place a limit on per diem cocaine purchases that will maximize
the benefits for those who wish to use powder cocaine and minimize
the amount of legally purchased cocaine that is converted into crack.
Finally, any legalization scheme that continues to criminalize crack,
retains the black market for crack. To the extent that crack dealers
cannot satisfy their customers through the conversion of legally
382 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64 (violence) and 93-98 (addiction).
989 See, e.g., DRIVE, supra note 56.
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purchased cocaine, importing and selling crack will continue as
before.
Despite these drawbacks, cocaine should be legalized, daily pur-
chases should be limited to a reasonable amount to accommodate
users without supplying the black market, but crack should remain
criminalized. Because the large majority of cocaine users use pow-
der cocaine rather than crack, 384 legalizing cocaine, but not crack,
will eliminate most of the volume of the cocaine-related black mar-
ket. To prohibit use of all types of cocaine unnecessarily ensures
that a high percentage of the drug-related black market, and the
economic compulsive and systemic violence that it engenders, re-
mains intact.
Overall, there are many benefits to a legalization scheme such
as the one outlined above. First, it is morally acceptable, placing
some limits on use while respecting the rights of persons as much
as possible. Second, systemic crime and violence will decrease mark-
edly because the black market for those twenty-one or older will
diminish significantly for any legal drug. Moreover, deaths attri-
butable to impure drugs will largely disappear, and AIDS contracted
by sharing needles will also decline. 385
 Third, economic compulsive
crime will decrease because legal drugs will cost less than black
market drugs. Fourth, taxes on legal drug sales will raise substantial
revenues for education, advertising and treatment. Fifth, addicts
will be more likely to seek treatment because their drug use will not
be illegal and increased funds will improve the availability of treat-
ment. Sixth, prison populations will decrease because fewer drug
users will be incarcerated, and the number of black market dealers
will lessen. Lastly, the revised law will eradicate the United States'
current hypocritical dichotomy between alcohol/cigarettes and ille-
gal drugs. Citizens will respect the remaining drug laws because
they will know that good reasons exist for the illegal status of certain
drugs.
To be sure, this legalization scheme has its drawbacks. It will
not remove the black market entirely because persons under twenty-
one will still be unable to purchase drugs legally. Legalization may
reduce the black market for those under twenty-one, however, be-
cause teenagers will be more cognizant of the risks in using black
market drugs. The black market in crack will also remain, as will
the systemic and economic compulsive crime that it engenders.
5" See Cloud, supra note 3, at 734.
"5 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.	 -
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Finally, there may be an increase in drug use, despite enhanced
education and advertising about the dangers of drug use. Nonethe-
less, this legalization scheme, or one similar to it, should be adopted
because it reduces crime and violence, and offers a moral solution
to the drug problem.
CONCLUSION
The war on drugs continues to be problematic. Progress in one
area is offset by problems in other areas. If certain drugs are le-
galized, crime should decrease. Although use of legalized drugs
may increase, this conclusion is not definite. Proper education can
minimize an increase in legal drug use.
This note suggests that, at the very least, marijuana and heroin
should be legalized. Cocaine should also be legalized but if the
difficulties in preventing cocaine from being converted into crack
prove too great, all types of cocaine should remain illegal. Legisla-
tors should determine the legal status of other drugs based on their
potential for addiction and propensity to induce violence. Of course,
ongoing research and study will help ensure that legislators make
proper decisions. The practical justifications for legalization already
exist but need to be more widely disseminated. In addition, we need
to reevaluate the moral issues in order to convert drug legalization
from a scholarly debate into political reality.
DAVID ELKINS
